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ABSTRACT
Shortly after the tragic events of September 11, 2001, Congress
passed the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act
("ATSSSA"). The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund ("VCF")
was the centerpiece of the statute and provided a source of no-fault
compensation to the tragedy's victims and victims'families. The ATSSSA
also permitted victims to pursue traditional litigation instead.
The A TSSSA contains three 'jurisdictional "features that have shaped
the path of the litigation. The Act created a federal cause of action 'for
damages arising out of" the terrorist-related aircraft crashes and gave the
Southern District of New York original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
actions "resulting from or relating to the terrorist-related aircraft
crashes. "Finally, it implemented a liability cap by limiting recovery in all
actions to the defendants' available liability insurance. These jurisdictional
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aspects of the "traditional" litigation option under the ATSSSA contain
unusual and practically unprecedented elements, yet they have received
almost no scholarly attention. This Article attempts to fill that gap by
telling the story of the course of the September 1 1 th litigation, tracking the
challenges and issues that have arisen as a result of the ATSSSA's
coordination mandate, and exploring the relationship between
federalization offorum and aggregation of claims.
The jurisdictional puzzles seen in the September 11th litigation call
for two new labels. "Event jurisdiction" refers to Congress's choice to give
the federal courts subject matter jurisdiction over cases relating to an event
of perceived national importance, rather than locating subject matter
jurisdiction over a certain class of cases or type of claim. The second
phenomenon deserves the label "protective coordination" because, like
protective jurisdiction, it evinces a congressional desire to protect certain
real or perceived federal interests by manipulating the shape and direction
of certain classes of lawsuits. This Article concludes by suggesting how
Congress might better evaluate postdisaster litigation legislation in the
future.
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked four airplanes, crashing
two of them into the World Trade Center ("WTC") towers in New York
City, and one into the Pentagon outside of Washington, D.C. Passengers on
the fourth plane managed to wrest control from the terrorists and crash the
plane into the ground in Shanksville, Pennsylvania before the terrorists
could use it to harm another civilian target. In all, 2973 people lost their
lives on the planes and on the ground,' and many more were injured.
Property damage was estimated in the billions of dollars.2 In the immediate
aftermath the nation stood transfixed at the scale of the catastrophe before
them. Television channels aired news twenty-four hours a day for over a
week after the incident, documenting the frantic rescue and recovery
missions, and straining to understand how and why this tragedy had
occurred. By September 29, 2001, the rescue missions were officially
declared at an end, and the long term cleanup began. The pile of debris at
the WTC site in lower Manhattan continued to smolder for over three
months, and it was nearly one year before workers had finished clearing the
debris.
1. THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 311 (2004).
2. Id.
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Shortly after the tragic events of September 11, 2001, Congress passed
the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act ("ATSSSA").3
The September 1 1th Victim Compensation Fund ("VCF") was the
centerpiece of the statute and provided a source of no-fault compensation to
the tragedy's victims and victims' families. The ATSSSA also allowed
victims to elect to pursue traditional litigation instead. Congress intended
for the ATSSSA to serve a dual purpose: for the victims of the attacks, the
statute would ensure an option for a speedy strict liability recovery; for the
potential defendants, particularly the airline industry, the statute would
shield them from crushing liability and possible insolvency and industry-
wide collapse.
Combined with a cap on liability for the airlines (and later other
industries and government actors), the ATSSSA and its unique
compensation fund were both hailed and scorned as an unprecedented
model of tort victim compensation.4 The fund, however, is only one half of
the compensation story. The jurisdictional aspects of the "traditional"
litigation option under the ATSSSA contain unusual and practically
unprecedented elements, yet they have received almost no scholarly
attention. This Article attempts to fill that gap.
The ATSSSA contains three jurisdictional features that have shaped
the path of the litigation. The Act created a federal cause of action "for
damages arising out of the hijacking and subsequent crashes of American
Airlines flights 11 and 77, and United Airlines flights 93 and 175, on
September 11, 2001."5 Section 408(b)(3) gave the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York ("SDNY") "original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all actions brought for any claim (including any
claim for loss of property, personal injury, or death) resulting from or
relating to the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001."6
Finally, it implemented a liability cap by limiting recovery in all actions to
the defendants' available liability insurance. 7
This Article tells the story of the course of the September 1 1th
litigation, and tracks the challenges and issues that have arisen as a result of
the ATSSSA coordination mandate. The unexpected twists and turns that
the litigation has taken suggest two new labels for jurisdictional concepts,
3. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230
(2001), reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (Supp. III 2003) [hereinafter ATSSSA].
4. See infra note 8.
5. ATSSSA § 408(b)(1).
6. Id. § 408(b)(3).
7. Id. § 408(a).
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"event jurisdiction" and "protective coordination."
Congress's choice to vest jurisdiction in a particular federal district
court is an act of significant consequence. It manifests a desire by Congress
to control the scope, organization, and direction of complex litigation,
decisions normally reserved for other judicial actors such as the parties, the
trial judge, state court actors, the Judicial Conference of the United States,
and the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ("JPML").
The jurisdictional puzzles seen in the September 11 th litigation call
for two new labels. "Event jurisdiction" refers to Congress's choice to give
the federal courts subject matter jurisdiction over an "event" of perceived
national importance, rather than locating subject matter jurisdiction over a
certain class of cases or type of claim. The second phenomenon deserves
the label "protective coordination" because, like protective jurisdiction, it
evinces a congressional wish to protect certain real or perceived federal
interests by manipulating the shape and direction of certain classes of
lawsuits. These venue and federalization provisions of the ATSSSA are not
accidental aspects of the statutory scheme; they are phenomena deserving
of analysis and criticism.
Part II tells the story of the complex and often unexpected dimensions
of the September 1 1th litigation. It shows that aside from doctrinal
problems, federalization of claims arising out of an event and congressional
specifications of venue present serious pragmatic concerns. Part III of this
Article discusses the basis for federal jurisdiction in these cases, and
identifies Congress's grant of jurisdiction in the ATSSSA as a form of
"event jurisdiction." It then questions whether such event jurisdiction is a
valid basis for federal jurisdiction over state law claims, and concludes that
most of the serious concerns arise as a result of protective coordination.
Part IV provides a brief overview of the legal doctrines of venue,
consolidation and coordination, and introduces the concept of protective
coordination. It then observes that protective coordination may insert an
additional layer of complexity into the already troubling constitutional
problems of protective jurisdiction. Part V suggests how Congress might
better draft legislation such as the ATSSSA in the future by offering a brief
case study comparing the post-September 11 th litigation with the post-
Katrina litigation.
This inquiry thus has both a broad and narrow aim. The broad goal is
to use the September 11 th litigation as a case study for examining some
undertheorized aspects of the role of federalism in jurisdiction and venue.
The more specific goal is to provide a comprehensive picture of the
[Vol. 81:199
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September 11 th litigation that has been proceeding outside of the VCF and
to answer the question, just how successful has the ATSSSA been at
creating a centralized and streamlined litigation process for these claims?
If, as I argue, the enterprise has not been entirely successful, then where did
Congress go wrong?
II. THE SEPTEMBER 11TH LITIGATION EXPERIENCE
A careful examination of the progress of the September 11 th litigation
contributes to an understanding of the utility and advisability of
coordination of cases by federal statute. Over the past six years, scholars
and practitioners have debated the effectiveness and prudence of the VCF,
the statute's central liability innovation.8 Some commentators also opined
that the ATSSSA's jurisdictional mandate-that all cases arising out of the
September 1 1th terrorist attacks would be brought in federal court-
combined with the statute's directive that underlying state tort law would
provide the rules of decision, implicates the issue of so-called "protective
jurisdiction," complete with its own set of potential problems.9 This
jurisdictional aspect of the ATSSSA vests jurisdiction not simply in the
federal courts, but in the SDNY. Scholars and practitioners alike have
ignored this aspect of the statute, perhaps because it appears so ordinary. In
8. For evaluation, praise, and criticism of the VCF, see generally Robert M. Ackerman, The
September 11 th Victim Compensation Fund: An Effective Administrative Response to National Tragedy,
10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 135 (2005); Elizabeth Berkowitz, The Problematic Role of the Special
Master: Undermining the Legitimacy of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 24 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 1 (2006); Richard P. Campbell, Implementing the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund: Two
Steps Forward, One Step Back, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 409 (2002); Martha Chamallas, The September 1 1th
Victim Compensation Fund: Rethinking the Damages Element in Injury Law, 71 TENN. L. REV. 51
(2003); Wendy Floering, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001: A Better Alternative
to Litigation?, 22 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 195 (2002); Tracy Hresko, Restoration and Relief:
Procedural Justice and the September 1 1th Victim Compensation Fund, 42 GONZ. L. REv. 95 (2006);
Linda S. Mullenix, The Future of Tort Reform: Possible Lessons from the World Trade Center Victim
Compensation Fund, 53 EMORY L.J. 1315 (2004); Jessica Ramirez, The Victims Compensation Fund: A
Model for Future Mass Casualty Situations, 29 TRANSP. L.J. 283 (2002); George Rutherglen,
Distributing Justice: The September I 1th Victim Compensation Fund and the Legacy of the Dalkon
Shield Claimants Trust, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 673 (2005); Joe Ward, The September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund: The Answer to Victim Relief?, 4 PEPP. DisP. RESOL. L.J. 161 (2003); James C.
Harris, Comment, Why the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund Proves the Case for a New
Zealand-style Comprehensive Social Insurance Plan in the United States, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 1367
(2006); Erin G. Holt, Note, The September 11 Victim Compensation Fund: Legislative Justice Sui
Generis, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 513 (2004); Jonathan D. Melber, Note, An Act of Discretion:
Rebutting Cantor Fitzgerald's Critique of the Victim Compensation Fund, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 749
(2003).
9. See, e.g., Eric J. Segall, Article III as a Grant of Power: Protective Jurisdiction, Federalism
and the Federal Courts, 54 FLA. L. REV. 361, 361-66 (2002) (questioning Congress's power under
Articles I and III to redirect state cases into federal court and still apply state law).
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fact, this sort of provision is quite revolutionary in statutory drafting.
What follows is an account of the progress of the September 11 th
claims litigated under the ATSSSA. 10 The September 11 th litigation is a
lesson in the unexpected. It began as one relatively coherent group of
claims, In re September 11 Litigation, but soon became three fairly distinct
groups of cases designated by four different master calendar numbers. 1'
"September 11 th Litigation" quickly became the umbrella term for a two-
part disaster litigation, a two-part mass tort litigation, and an insurance
battle. This narrative is used in Part III to demonstrate the incoherence of
"event jurisdiction," and in Part IV to caution against future use of
"protective coordination."
A. THE INITIAL ASSIGNMENT TO JUDGE HELLERSTEIN AND THE FIRST
MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE SEPARATE CASES
By the middle of 2002, SDNY Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein had
accepted twelve cases filed pursuant to the ATSSSA. The defendants at the
time included the airlines, airport security companies, and other aviation
related entities, World Trade Center Properties and its various subsidiaries,
the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey ("PANYNJ"), and other
property owners and operators on the WTC site. Shortly thereafter, the
court granted a motion by the Transportation Security Administration
("TSA") to intervene in the cases, as well as to consolidate the cases
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a). 12 On November 1, 2002,
Judge Hellerstein formalized this consolidation by assigning a master
docket number and a caption to the pending actions. 13 The assigned
caption, In re September 11 Litigation, suggests what the parties and the
judge believed at that time-that the litigation would be described and
handled as one large group before a single judge, with only a few
exceptions. 14
10. A chart summarizing the field of the September 11 th Litigation appears as Figure 1 in Part
II.E.
11. See United States District Court, Southern District of New York, September 11 th Litigation
Cases, at http://wwwl .nysd.uscourts.gov/cases.php?form=sept I1 (last visited Jan. 2, 2008).
12. Mariani v. United Air Lines, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 11620 (AKH), 2002 WL 1685382, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2002) (ordering "all actions for wrongful death, personal injury, and property
damage or business loss currently pending or hereinafter filed pursuant to the Act against any airline
and/or airline security company ... are hereby consolidated for purposes of pretrial proceedings .... ").
13. In re Sept. II Litig., No. 21 MC 97 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2002) (order consolidating
actions and establishing a master docket).
14. Two groups of cases were excluded from Judge Hellerstein's docket from the outset of the
litigation. The first included cases against alleged promoters, financiers, sponsors and supporters of the
September 11 th terrorist attacks, and were excluded because they were explicitly excluded from claims
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The cases filed within the first months after September 11 th matched
these expectations. Most claims involved allegations of personal injury,
wrongful death, or property damage suffered during the September 1lth
attacks themselves. Judge Hellerstein worked with the litigants during these
initial months to coordinate the proceedings pending before SDNY with the
VCF proceedings, and to organize how any remaining litigation would
proceed.
1. The Victim Compensation Fund
Congress created the VCF under the ATSSSA as an alternative to
litigation, intending for it to provide a swift and reliable source of
compensation for victims while simultaneously shielding the airline
industry from potentially crippling lawsuits.' 5 The fund only covered
personal injury and wrongful death cases, and did not apply to instances of
property damage or business loss. Ultimately, the VCF processed over
7400 cases and awarded a median of $855,919.50 per victim in
compensation (with a median award of $1.6 million for deceased
victims). 16
Although the Special Master's compensation determinations were
"final and not subject to judicial review," 17 Judge Hellerstein adjudicated
disputes related to the administration of the VCF. In a series of rulings, he
sustained the regulations for the VCF promulgated by the Department of
Justice and the compensation formula devised by Special Master Kenneth
under the ATSSSA. See ATSSSA, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 408(c), 115 Stat. 230 (2001), reprinted in 49
U.S.C. § 40101 note (Supp. III 2003). These cases were originally filed in a few different districts, and
themselves became multidistrict litigation in the SDNY, consolidated before Judge Casey. See In re
Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 1379 (J.P.M.L. 2003). The second included
cases against and among the insurers of property damaged at ground zero. See, e.g., Can. Life
Assurance Co. v. Converium Riockversicherung (Deutschland) AG, 210 F. Supp. 2d 322, 329-30
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that no federal jurisdiction exists under the ATSSSA for a dispute between a
reinsurer and retrocessionaire concerning losses arising out of the terrorist-related crashes of September
11 th). The exceptions to this rule were the liability insurance provider cases, which remained before
Judge Hellerstein. ATSSSA § 405(c)(3)(B)(i) (suits to recover "collateral source obligations" are
excluded from the ATSSSA jurisdiction). See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text for discussion
of these cases.
15. The creation and administration of the VCF was a unique and controversial remedy by
Congress, and has received extensive scholarly commentary. See sources cited supra note 8.
16. KENNETH R. FEINBERG ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
MASTER FOR THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001, 109-11, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/final-report.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2008). Around $7 billion was paid to
claimants, including 2880 claimants whose family members died in the crashes or building collapses
and 2680 persons who suffered physical injury at the Pentagon and WTC site. Id. at 110.
17. ATSSSA § 405(b)(3).
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Feinberg against a number of challenges on administrative law grounds, 18
interpreted the meaning of a waiver of a right to sue under the ATSSSA,' 9
and determined when a claim was deemed "filed" with the Special
Master.2° These holdings reflected September 11 th litigation as Congress
probably imagined it: the district court was spared the task of adjudging or
reviewing awards to individual plaintiffs, but played an important
background role in settling disputes over the interpretation of the statute
and structure of the fund's administration.
2. Organizing the Remaining Litigation
As the deadline for victims to apply to the VCF came to a close, Judge
Hellerstein and the litigants intensified the focus on organizing the
remaining litigation. The litigants appeared to fall into three broad
categories: (1) insurance companies that provided liability insurance for
Silverstein Properties and PANYNJ; 21 (2) litigants with claims of wrongful
death and personal injury who had elected not to enter the VCF (including
a number of personnel involved in the rescue and cleanup effort who had
begun to file claims alleging respiratory injury); and (3) property damage
plaintiffs. A few miscellaneous cases also remained.22
The remaining litigants scored their first major victory on the path to
trial in 2003 while the VCF was still open. 23 Judge Hellerstein ruled that
the aviation defendants owed a duty of care to the ground victims because
the events were within the scope of foreseeable duty.
24
18. Colaio v. Feinberg, 262 F. Supp. 2d 273, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), aff'd in part, dismissed in
part, Schneider v. Feinberg, 345 F.3d 135, 149 (2d Cir. 2003).
19. In re Sept. 11 th Litig., No. 21 MC 97 (AKH), 2004 WL 1320897, at *5-7 (S.D.N.Y. June 10,
2004).
20. In re Sept. 11 Litig., No. 21 MC 97 (AKH), 2003 WL 23145579, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19,
2003).
21. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Grosshandels-und Lagerei-Berufsgenossenschaft v. World Trade Ctr. Props., LLC,
435 F.3d 136, 137-38 (2d Cir. 2006) (affirming district court decision that German insurers cannot
pursue state law tort claims on behalf of victims who have received VCF benefits).
23. Since participation in the VCF precluded a plaintiff from proceeding with any civil litigation,
see ATSSSA § 405(c)(3)(B)(i), the court created a "suspense docket" to allow plaintiffs to preserve
their right to file a civil action while deciding whether to pursue a claim before the VCF. In re Sept. I I
Litig., No. 21 MC 97 (AKH), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14411 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2003) (order outlining
procedure with respect to suspending actions). The VCF administrators created a similar procedure by
which families could submit a preliminary application, without waiving the right to sue. See 28 C.F.R. §
104.2 1(b) (2006).
24. In re Sept. II Litig., 280 F. Supp. 2d 279, 292-93, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that "[tlhe
Aviation Defendants, and plaintiffs and society generally, could reasonably have expected that the
screening methods at [airports used by the Aviation Defendants] were for the protection of people on
the ground as well as for those on board the airplanes," and that "the crash of the airplanes was within
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The court denied motions to dismiss ground victims' complaints
brought by the PANYNJ and WTC Defendants as well, holding that under
New York law, they owed a duty of care to the lessees, occupants, and
others on the premises.
2 5
Judge Hellerstein rejected the argument that the criminal acts of the
terrorists were intervening acts that broke the chain of causation, holding
that it was too early to rule that proximate cause could not be found. Citing
the absence of a well-developed factual record, the court put this argument
on hold, finding proximate cause at least at the level of the plaintiffs'
allegations.
26
With the denial of the motions to dismiss against the aviation
defendants, the PANYNJ and the WTC entities, the litigation against a
multitude of defendants was set to continue to discovery and, possibly, a
trial.2 7 The decision also highlighted the ways in which the litigation ahead
would be complex. Had legal remedies been limited by a small class of
victims on the planes against a small group of defendants, the cases would
have resembled an "air and common disaster" litigation.28 The court's
decision, however, recognized that September l1th involved multiple
classes of victims that were owed varying duties of care by different types
of defendants. At this stage in the litigation, it was enough for Judge
Hellerstein to conclude that cases could proceed beyond the Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss,29 and that development of a factual record was required
for any further determinations. The complexity of the duty question
foreshadowed the ways in which different classes of plaintiffs would pull
the once unitary litigation in different directions.
the class of foreseeable hazards resulting from negligently performed security screening").
25. Id. at 299-301 ("[T]he parties and society would reasonably expect that the WTC Defendants
would have a duty to the occupants of the Twin Towers in designing, constructing, repairing and
maintaining the structures, in conforming to appropriate building and fire safety codes, and in creating
appropriate evacuation routes and procedures should an emergency occur.").
26. See id. at 293 (aviation defendants); id. at 302 (WTC entities). Note, however, that the
court's holding is with respect to the validity of plaintiffs' pleadings, and calls for future litigation to
settle these issues. Id.
27. On July 2, 2007, Judge Hellerstein ordered, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
42(b), that some of the 21 MC 97 cases would be bifurcated and proceed to trial on the issue of
damages only. In re Sept. II Litig., No. 21 MC 97 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2007) (order scheduling
damages trial and pretrial proceedings).
28. The phrase "air and common disaster" is a designation used for administrative purposes by
the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation. John F. Nangle, From the Horse's Mouth: The Workings
of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 66 DEF. COUNSEL J. 341, 342 (1999).
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
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B. RESPIRATORY DISTRESS CASEs-21 MC 100 AND 21 MC 102
The collapse of the towers at Ground Zero led to a major rescue,
recovery, and cleanup effort. The City of New York took control of the
WTC site immediately after the collapse of the buildings and did not return
control of the site to the PANYNJ until July 2002.30 These postcollapse
efforts involved thousands of fire fighters and other rescue personnel
coordinated by a number of public and private parties. The acts of heroic
rescue workers and selfless volunteers are an enduring memory of the days
and months after September 11 th.31 The reality, however, is that the vast
majority of those involved in the cleanup effort were employees of
government agencies or government contractors and Ground Zero was
transformed into a giant workplace. And with a workplace came accidents.
As of early 2002, the extent of workplace injury at the WTC site was
underappreciated. According to one report, only "35 of the more than 1,500
workers assigned to help clear debris from the World Trade Center site
were seriously injured in more than six months of work there," and federal
statistics initially reported that "the job had turned out to be far less
dangerous than an average demolition job in the United States." 32 This was
a premature prediction.
Workers injured at the site began to file complaints for violations
under New York State Labor Laws in state court.33 The defendants
removed these cases to federal court and the plaintiffs moved for remand.
Judge Hellerstein granted the motion to remand in two of these early cases
in which plaintiffs alleged injury from falling debris at the WTC site.
The opinions in Graybill v. City of New York 34 and Spagnuolo v. Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey35 set the outer boundaries for the
subject matter jurisdiction of cases brought under or removed pursuant to
the ATSSSA.36 Judge Hellerstein found that the tort concept of "proximate
30. In re WTC Disaster Site, 414 F.3d 352, 358 (2d Cir. 2005).
31. For a more comprehensive narrative account of the rescue, recovery, and cleanup effort, see
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 278-323; Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Toxic Torts at
Ground Zero, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 383 (2007) (describing the nature of environmental hazards at the WTC
site).
32. Eric Lipton, Injuries Few Among Crews at Towers Site, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2002, at B1.
33. See NY LAB. LAW §§ 240-42 (2007). New York Labor Law provides the commissioner with
the power to impose liability for construction, repair and demolition work and has been said to establish
strict liability. For a description of the relevant New York labor law and how it might apply to WTC
site workers' claims, see George W. Conk, Will the Post 9/11 World Be a Post-Tort World?, 112 PENN.
ST. L. REv. 175 (2007).
34. Graybill v. City of New York, 247 F. Supp. 2d 345,347-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
35. Spagnuolo v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 245 F. Supp. 2d 521, 522-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
36. See Graybill, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 346 ("Congress did not intend to oust state court jurisdiction
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causation provides a useful framework for limiting the scope" 37 of
jurisdiction and that it was insufficient merely to allege that "the accident
took place on the WTC site."38 This is a rare instance in which the
substantive tort principle of proximate cause was used (if only by analogy)
to make a jurisdictional determination in the context of September 11 th
litigation.39 As will be seen later, when event jurisdiction is an organizing
principle of federalizing claims, the district judge will need to "front-end"
proximate cause analysis or make proximate cause-like determinations in
order to rule on jurisdiction.
1. The First Grouping-Claims of Respiratory Injury by On-Site Workers
(21 MC 100)
Allegations of respiratory injury presented a more complicated
jurisdictional challenge than Graybill and Spagnuolo. The first workers to
allege respiratory injuries from the WTC site filed lawsuits in New York
state court in 2002.40
The workers claimed that they suffered the injuries as a result of
breathing air at the WTC site that was polluted by a multitude of toxins
released during the collapse of the towers and the fires that burned there for
months afterwards. They alleged that New York City, the PANYNJ, and
private entities41 were negligent because they failed to provide the workers
with appropriate respiratory masks and safety gear.
42
Eager to be included in the statutory liability cap, the defendants
removed the cases to SDNY under the ATSSSA. Over the next several
in cases such as this involving injuries common to construction and demolition sites generally, and risks
and duties not alleged to be particular to the special conditions caused by the terrorist-related aircraft
crashes of September 11.") (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 352.
38. Id.
39. This is not the first time that courts have resorted to proximate cause analysis in order to
define the scope of federal jurisdiction. See Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.,
513 U.S. 527, 534-38 (1995) (examining the proximate cause of damage by a vessel to affirm a finding
of federal admiralty jurisdiction).
40. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 270 F. Supp. 2d 357, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), aff'd
in part, 414 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 2005).
41. Id. Private entity defendants included Silverstein Properties and the multitude of contractors
and construction companies involved in the cleanup operation. See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site
Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d 520, 540 nn.10-13 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
42. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 361. See also Eggen, supra note 31. In a
related case, it was alleged that to the extent that "the equipment was available[,] there was little effort
to properly fit the masks, to educate workers regarding the risks, to overcome to considerable
misinformation that had been put forth, or to enforce the equipment's use by the workers." Conk, supra
note 33, at 200 (citing plaintiffs' statement of facts).
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months Judge Hellerstein received about 1200"3 such respiratory injury
claims and grouped them alongside other personal injury claims.44 The
number of plaintiffs alleging respiratory injury had, however, grown so
significantly that the court and the parties agreed that they warranted the
creation of a separate master calendar designation.4
5
It was during this time that Judge Hellerstein first ruled on the motions
to remand the cases to state court. Plaintiffs were most likely anxious to see
the cases back in New York state court because it provided a forum which
would be familiar with processing workers' compensation claims,46 and,
more importantly, a forum which was almost certainly free from the
liability cap of the ATSSSA.
The district court ruling on subject matter jurisdiction attempted to
split the difference. Judge Hellerstein accepted that the ATSSSA provided
an adequate basis for federal question jurisdiction. The court's task, then,
was to interpret the meaning of "resulting from or relating to the terrorist-
related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001" of the ATSSSA.4 7 Having
already ruled that ordinary workplace accidents that occurred after
September 11, 2001, itself were not sufficient bases of federal jurisdiction
alone,48 the court was left with the task of sorting out exactly how unique
respiratory injuries were to the events of September 11 th and how far
removed in time the injuries could be from September 11 th and still "arise
from" events of that day.
The court held that "claims for respiratory injury based on exposures
suffered at the World Trade Center site between September 11, 2001 and
September 29, 2001 'arise out of,' 'result from,' and are 'related to' the
attacks of September 11, 2001" because they involved the official search
43. See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 539 ("1 ordered further that Plaintiffs
file separate claims for each individual claimant, holding that the individual issues relevant to each
claimant predominated over common issues.").
44. These cases were placed on the suspense docket along with all other September 11 th-related
cases. A few of the respiratory injury plaintiffs who filed claims during this period also filed claims
with the VCF, and their claims were dismissed in April 2004 along with the other plaintiffs who had
opted to avail themselves of the VCF procedure as an alternative to litigation. In re World Trade Ctr.
Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100 (AKH), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6780 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2004)
(order granting extension of suspense docket in part, dismissing claims in part).
45. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2003)
(order establishing master docket).
46. A few plaintiffs, however, did not move for remand and agreed with defendants that federal
law governed the case. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 363 n.4.
47. ATSSSA, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 408(b)(3), 115 Stat. 230 (2001), reprinted in 49 U.S.C. §
40101 note (Supp. III 2003).
48. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
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and rescue effort.49 All other claims alleging injuries that occurred after this
period were remanded to state court because "[b]y September 29, 2001,
that predominant task officially ended and workers' efforts were focused
on ... clean-up of the World Trade Center site."
50
Recognizing that the plain language of the statute contains language of
complete preemption,5' the court identified its primary interpretive task as
defining the scope of state law claims that are preempted by the federal
cause of action established in the ATSSSA. Judge Hellerstein was
particularly sensitive to the fact that a finding of preemption in these cases
would displace not only ordinary state law tort claims, but also state labor
law claims. He found that the ATSSSA lacked the clear congressional
intent to preempt "such a strong and long-standing state policy" and to
"oust the court having expertise interpreting [New York Labor Law] .52
Relying on the outer jurisdictional boundaries set by Graybill and
Spagnuolo, Judge Hellerstein concluded that the jurisdiction over the
workers' claims needed to be limited to avoid a seemingly unlimited field
of jurisdiction. At the same time, he acknowledged the legislative history
that underscored the congressional intent to "promote efficiency" in the
September 1 1th litigation and Congress's intent to provide defendants,
including New York City, with "much needed relief from potential liability
arising out of the attacks on the World Trade Center .... ,53 Judge
Hellerstein thus sought a point in time that demarcated a shift from
September 1 1th events to ordinary workplace events and held that
"September 29, 2001 is a proper demarcation point and the World Trade
Center site is a proper geographical limitation" because
[a]fter that point, or outside the World Trade Center site, the goals of
demolition, clean-up and removal of debris were dominant, the
traditional state interest in regulating the health and safety of employees
in the work place re-emerged, and any federal interest in displacing
traditional state police powers waned.54
The court then employed the tort doctrine of proximate cause to
49. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 361.
50. Id. at 372.
51. Id. at 368. The doctrine states that "'if a federal cause of action completely preempts a state
cause of action any complaint that comes within the scope of the federal cause of action necessarily
'arises under' federal law."' Id. at 366 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust,
463 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
52. Id. at 374.
53. Id. at 371 (quoting 147 Cong. Rec. H7649 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 2001) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner quoting letter submitted by Mayor Rudolph Giuliani in support of the amendment)).
54. Id. at 374.
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reinforce its holding that "the causal relationship with the terrorist-related
aircraft crashes becomes attenuated, and duties and responsibilities
associated with the workplace become predominant. 55 Proximate cause
thus returned to the court's jurisdictional analysis as a way of linking the
task of statutory interpretation with the more functional task of attempting
to group cases sensibly for litigation purposes.
Several parties agreed with the court that, like the duty of care
question generally, the question of subject matter jurisdiction was so
important to how the litigation would proceed that it required early
resolution. Finding that "the scope of federal jurisdiction in these cases
involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial
ground for difference of opinion" and that an "immediate appeal also may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation," Judge
Hellerstein certified the issue for interlocutory appeal.56
The number of respiratory injury cases filed ballooned while the court
waited for a definitive statement on jurisdiction from the Second Circuit.
Judge Hellerstein denied certification of any class actions and required that
each plaintiff file under a separate docket number in order to best organize
pleadings and potential causation questions. 57 The individual complaints
had begun to present extraordinary organizational challenges for Judge
Hellerstein's chambers, and he sought a way to engage the parties' help in
organizing the information about each litigant so that the information
would be accessible to the court, the parties, and the public.58 Charged with
this task, plaintiffs' and defendants' committees negotiated a new set of
Master Complaints that included a "check box" section.59 The court hoped
to collect data on, among other things, the nature of injuries alleged, the
type of worker involved, where on the WTC site the worker was assigned,
and the time period that he or she worked. Although the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure do not require this sort of detailed pleading, Judge
55. Id. at 377.
56. Id. at 381. As a technical matter, Judge Hellerstein could only certify those cases for appeal
in which he had denied the motions to remand because a district court grant of remand for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction is not appealable. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2000).
57. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d 520, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
58. Transcript of Status Conference at 3-6, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21
MC 100 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2005) (on file with author); Transcript of Status Conference at 19-
38, In re Sept. II Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2005) (on file with
author).
59. See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15,
2006) (order designating Check-Off ("Short Form") Complaint Related to the Master Complaint); In re
World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2005) (case
management order).
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Hellerstein urged the parties to consider the advantages to defining the
contours of each case and of the litigation as a whole as early as possible. 60
In July of 2005, the Second Circuit delivered an opinion interpreting
the jurisdictional and preemptive scope of the ATSSSA in quite general
terms,61 holding that "Congress intended the ATSSSA to preempt at least
the claims brought by the plaintiffs in the 35 cases dealt with in the district
court's opinion." 62 The court not only emphasized the forceful language of
the statute in displacing state law remedies, but also recognized the
boundary issue because "the respective reaches of terms such as 'arising
out of,' 'resulting from,' and 'relating to' are not self-evident. 63
Comparing § 405 of the statute (VCF eligibility) with § 408 (creating the
cause of action), the court concluded that the "resulting from or relating to"
language in § 408 was clearly broader than "arising out of."' Because the
terms "resulting from" and "relating to" are ambiguous, the court turned to
legislative history for support, and was persuaded of the statute's expansive
scope by statements from legislators who referred to "all lawsuits," "all
civil litigation," and "all civil suits." 65 The court then stated that "[t]he
provisions of § 408 give no indication that Congress intended preemption
to be limited to claims with respect to persons who were on the hijacked
airplanes or who were present at one of the crash sites at the time of the
crashes or immediately thereafter." 66 The Second Circuit believed the
causal connection between the events of September 1 1th and the
respiratory injuries were "considerably more extensive than simple 'but
for' causation." 67 The court wrote:
As it requires no great stretch to view claims of injuries from inhalation
of air rendered toxic by the fires, smoke, and pulverized debris caused by
the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11 as claims "relating
to" and "arising out of' those crashes, we conclude that Congress
60. Transcript of Status Conference at 19-38, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21
MC 100 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2005) (on file with author); Transcript of Status Conference at 5-7,
In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2005) (on file
with author).
61. As a technical matter, the court of appeals only had jurisdiction over the appeals of the
plaintiffs challenging the denial of their request to remand the cases to state court. In re WTC Disaster
Site, 414 F.3d 352, 363 (2d Cir. 2005). The Second Circuit held that the orders of remand issued by the
district court were unreviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). Id. at 363-71.
62. Id. at 375.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 376 ("[A] phrase such as 'relat[ing] to' is 'clearly expansive."' (quoting N.Y. State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645,655 (1995))).
65. Id. at 377.
66. Id. at 376.
67. Id. at 378.
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intended the ATSSSA's cause of action to be sufficiently expansive to
cover claims of respiratory injuries by workers in sifting, removing,
transporting, or disposing of that debris.
68
Convinced that the respiratory injury plaintiffs all shared questions of
fact and law with other claimants under the ATSSSA, the Second Circuit
rehearsed the usual litany of reasons to consolidate cases, namely, the
"undesirable effects that litigation of September 11 claims in the various
state and federal courts would inevitably produce." 69 The circuit court did
not address Judge Hellerstein's observation that accepting jurisdiction over
a large open-ended class of litigants might have efficiency problems of its
own.
70
After this lengthy discussion of the statute's apparently clear
preemptive force, the court acknowledged the prominent role that state law
would continue to play in adjudication of the claims. It stated, "What
ATSSSA itself displaces is not the substantive standards governing
liability, but only the state-law damage remedies."
71
Despite its confidence in interpreting the ATSSSA, the court declined
to delineate the exact boundaries of the statute. "No doubt there will be
some claims whose relationship to the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of
September 11, 2001, is 'too tenuous, remote, or peripheral,' to warrant a
finding that those claims 'relat[e] to' those crashes; but we make no attempt
to draw a definitive line here."72
The district court responded by extending jurisdiction to all cases
covered by the reasoning of the Second Circuit,73 and has since ruled on
motions by some of the defendants concerning sovereign immunity
68. Id at 377.
69. Id. at 378 ("These effects might include: inconsistent or varying adjudications of actions
based on the same sets of facts; adjudications having a preclusive effect on non-parties or substantially
impairing or impeding non-parties' abilities to protect their rights; victims or their survivors without
any possibility of recovery when the limits of liability have been exhausted in other lawsuits; the
difficulties in mediation when defendants are sued in multiple state and federal courts, and the waste of
private and judicial resources in multiple state and federal courts hearing cases involving the same
factual and legal issues." (quoting Can. Life Assurance Co. v. Converium Riickversicherung
(Deutschland) AG, 335 F.3d 52, 59 (2d Cir. 2003))).
70. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 270 F. Supp. 2d 357, 378-79 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
71. In re WTC Disaster Site, 414 F.3d at 380.
72. Id. at 381 (quoting N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 661 (1995)) (emphasis added).
73. See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100 (AKH), 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14705, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2005) (order following appellate remand extending
jurisdiction).
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defenses.
74
2. Off-Site Workers (21 MC 102) and "Straddler" Plaintiffs (21 MC 103)
Following the Second Circuit decision, the jurisdictional problems had
not been completely solved.75 The district court had begun to receive a new
variety of respiratory distress claims from workers who were employed in
construction or cleanup efforts in the buildings and areas surrounding
Ground Zero and scattered throughout lower Manhattan.
Like their earlier "on-site" counterparts, 76 the off-site claimants filed
in state court and the defendants removed the cases to federal district court
pursuant to the ATSSSA. In all, 190 of these plaintiffs allege to have
worked both on and off the WTC site, and the district court created yet
another Master Calendar docket number to accommodate their status." The
district court has not yet ruled on the jurisdictional issues. At present, the
parties are proceeding as if subject matter jurisdiction exists and have
drafted master complaints and case management orders to mirror those
employed in the 21 MC 100 litigation.78 One key difference between the
two dockets is that the off-site litigants will not have access to the Captive
Insurer that will fund the awards or settlements of plaintiffs suing the City
and its contractors.
3. Appointment of Special Masters
By the fall of 2005, Judge Hellerstein's concern for the enormity and
complexity of the full scope of September 11 th litigation before him
increased. He expressed concern to the parties that the litigation would
continue for a very long period of time and this was contrary to the
74. See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
75. See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14705, at *9
(concluding that subject matter jurisdiction issues may be revisited upon future challenges).
76. The parties and district court agreed to a formal definition of what constituted the World
Trade Center site. It is defined as "the 16-acre site including the sites of the buildings known as I World
Trade Center, 2 World Trade Center, 3 World Trade Center (a/k/a the Marriott World Trade Center
Hotel), 4 World Trade Center, 5 World Trade Center and 7 World Trade Center, as well as the
surrounding plaza and underground shopping, parking, and public transit facilities." In re World Trade
Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2005) (case management order
outlining timing and manner of discovery).
77. See In re Combined World Trade Ctr. & Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC
103 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2007) (case management order).
78. See In re World Trade Ctr. Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 102 (AK)
(S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2007); In re Combined World Trade Ctr. & Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig.,
No. 21 MC 103 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2007); In re World Trade Ctr. Lower Manhattan Disaster
Site Litig., No. 21 MC 102 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2007); In re World Trade Ctr. Lower Manhattan
Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 102 (AKE) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2007).
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congressional desire for a speedy and efficient resolution of the lawsuits.
At this time, he contemplated appointing mediators to oversee one or more
aspects of the litigation, especially with an eye toward some sort of a global
settlement.79
Several attempts to mobilize this plan did not result in any
appointments for the litigation as a whole. Judge Hellerstein was eventually
able, however, to appoint Special Masters for the respiratory distress
cases.
80
C. THE LIABILITY INSURANCE ENTANGLEMENT-03 CIV. 0332
The events of September 11 th gave rise to numerous disputes between
insureds and insurers and amongst the insurers themselves, and Judge
Hellerstein accepted jurisdiction over the liability insurance litigation
pursuant to the ATSSSA. 81
As a preliminary matter, adjudicating the rights of the insureds and the
responsibilities of the insurers was complicated by the change in ownership
of the World Trade Center preceding the collapse of the towers. 82 This left
the court with a combination of "binders" and completed insurance
contracts.8 3 As of September 11, 2001, the insurance coverage was still in
79. Transcript of Status Conference, In re Sept. 11 th, No. 21 MC 97 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8,
2005) (on file with author).
80. See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d 520, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
81. Most of these cases did not come to Judge Hellerstein because they were not brought
pursuant to the ATSSSA. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. In fact, many of these cases were
filed in and remained in state court.
82. The PANYNJ sold the World Trade Center to Larry Silverstein through various entities
known as Silverstein Properties or World Trade Center Properties in early 2001 after months of intense
negotiations. Charles V. Bagli, Deal Is Signed to Take Over Trade Center, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2001,
at B 1. The PANYNJ had wanted to divest itself of the WTC. The sale was accomplished by granting a
ninety-nine year lease to Silverstein Properties and associated subsidiaries (World Trade Center
Properties, etc.). Id.
83. As is typical in large real estate transactions, Silverstein sought insurance coverage for the
property that was not finalized until after the deal had closed. The process of obtaining liability
insurance was further delayed by the fact that the WTC had been owned and operated by the PANYNJ,
an entity that enjoyed sovereign immunity due to its status as an intergovernmental agency. Therefore,
the premises did not have a liability record and the insurance broker had difficulty obtaining bids from
prospective insurers without this data. See In re Sept. 11 th Liab. Ins. Coverage Cases, 458 F. Supp. 2d
104, 108-12 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). In such transactions, the insurers issue a "binder" to the insured that
contains the typical and anticipated state-specific clauses for the property and risks to be insured. The
parties then continue negotiations and the final policy is issued a few months later. Another feature of a
large real estate transaction is the insurance "tower," that is, the entity is insured by one large primary
policy, and then is insured for additional sums by layers of excess insurers. Silverstein secured a
primary and secondary "umbrella" policy from Zurich American Group (Zurich) and eight layers of
excess insurance involving as many as twenty other insurers above that. Id. at 109. The aggregate
policies totaled $1 billion in coverage. The primary policy was a $2 million per occurrence, $4 million
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various states of completion. Only a few of the insurers had issued final
policies. The rest, including the primary insurer, had only issued binders,
followed by scattered negotiation communications. 8 The situation was
further complicated by the existence of two other towers of liability
insurance, the insurers for PANYNJ (who still owned and operated aspects
of the WTC site such as the PATH station), and the insurers for Westfield,
the holding company that leased and operated the shopping mall space
beneath the WTC site. 8
5
Although Judge Hellerstein hesitated to accept jurisdiction of this case
as part of the ATSSSA consolidation, the parties convinced him that
resolution of the insurance dispute was integral to administration of the
underlying cases. The court then found itself drawn into a bitter and
complicated dispute beset by discovery difficulties and having little to do
with the legal and factual questions of the underlying lawsuits.8 6 In
reaching its decisions, the court realized that it would have to make several
purely hypothetical findings about the extent of coverage in the absence of
clear contours of the underlying litigation and sought to avoid making such
speculative rulings. On the other hand, the ATSSSA had linked the
resolution of the underlying litigation inextricably to the limits of the
available liability insurance coverage. 87 The course of the litigation and the
possibility of reaching any sort of settlement will depend on knowledge of
the available pool of insurance. These issues remain largely unresolved.
D. THE PROPERTY DAMAGE CASES (21 MC 101) AND THE SPECIAL CASE
OF 7WTC
The ATSSSA authorized a federal cause of action for plaintiffs
seeking redress for property damage as a result of the events of September
1lth.88 The plaintiffs were not, however, eligible to file claims for property
damage before the VCF.89
The property damages claims proceeded alongside the personal injury
and wrongful death cases under the heading 21 MC 97 for the first three
aggregate, and the Zurich umbrella covered $50 million per occurrence in excess of the primary policy.
Id. at 109-10.
84. See id. at 109.
85. See id. at 110, 116.
86. See In re Sept. l1th Liab. Ins. Coverage Cases, 243 F.R.D. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (order
granting sanctions for pleadings and discovery abuses).
87. In re Sept. I 1th Liab. Ins. Coverage Cases, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 128.
88. ATSSSA, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 408(b)(1), 115 Stat. 230 (2001), reprinted in 49 U.S.C. §
40101 note (Supp. 1II 2003).
89. Id. § 405(c)(3)(B)(i).
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years of the September 11 th litigation.9" This was unremarkable given the
common issues of causation and duty of care along with similar discovery
needs of the plaintiffs. As time passed, however, differences among the
groups of plaintiffs emerged.
As a preliminary matter, the fact that the property damage plaintiffs
were attached to the personal injury and wrongful death plaintiffs meant
that the property damage plaintiffs had to accept a slower timeline for
litigation. Although the court ruled on preliminary issues of duty of care
and proximate cause on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss standard, the
court and the parties understood that the "real" work of moving the
litigation forward could not begin until the VCF had closed and its
attendant issues were settled.91
The property damage plaintiffs and the personal injury and wrongful
death litigants did not always stand as one unified group. Although
common issues remained, the property damage plaintiffs had their own
agenda, particularly concerning damages. Moreover, on several occasions,
the property damage plaintiffs expressed concerns that a high-visibility trial
featuring the wrongful death plaintiffs might result in extremely high jury
verdicts, thus cutting deeply into the liability cap; or that some of the
personal injury and wrongful death plaintiffs would act as unreasonable
"hold-outs," thus preventing a reasonable global settlement plan.92 In
March 2005 the court ordered the creation of yet another Master Calendar
docket, 21 MC 101, In re September 11 Property Damage and Business
Loss Litigation to coordinate all property damage plaintiffs.
One class of property damage lawsuits presents unique issues-the
insurers who were subrogees of the owners and occupants of the building 7
World Trade Center ("7WTC").93 Among the neighboring buildings to
sustain structural damage on September 11 th, 7WTC was the only building
that was not directly hit but nonetheless collapsed completely. Building
7WTC housed a large trading floor for Citigroup as well as New York
City's Office of Emergency Management. Both entities relied upon
massive oil tanks stored in the building's basement to serve as emergency
90. Transcript of Status Conference at 2, 4-5, In re Sept. 1 I th Litig., No. 21 MC 97 (AKH)
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2005) (on file with author).
91. See generally Transcript of Status Conference, In re Sept. 1 th, Nos. 21 MC 97 & 21 MC
100 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2004) (on file with author).
92. See Transcript of Status Conference at 3-8, In re Sept. 11 th Litig., No. 21 MC 97 (AKH)
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2005) (on file with author).
93. Luckily, 7WTC was successfully evacuated before it collapsed. Therefore, the 7WTC cases
involve only property damage claims and no personal injury or wrongful death claims.
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power generators. This fact opened up new avenues of causation arguments
for the defendants, and caused them to implead other parties whom they
believed shared or bore either complete or partial responsibility. 94 The
defendants made motions to dismiss based on these causation arguments,
related duty of care arguments, and sovereign immunity arguments from
state law and federal law sources. Judge Hellerstein granted some of these
motions in part and dismissed a number of defendants, but the core cases
remain and the causation questions remain open. The 7WTC cases have
developed a sufficiently unique path such that they often meet apart from
the other litigants for status conferences and oral arguments. 95
E. SPECIAL DISCOVERY DIFFICULTIES
The September 11 th litigants have faced unusual stumbling blocks in
the discovery phase of litigation. The disputed documents are primarily
those that the plaintiffs have sought from the aviation defendants and from
the Transportation Security Administration ("TSA"). The TSA classifies
many documents as "Sensitive Security Information" ("SSI"), and will not
release these documents for discovery, or will only release redacted
versions. The decision to classify material as SSI is an administrative
decision, appeal of which can be made only to a federal circuit court.96 This
presents a two-fold problem. It denies litigants the documents they need,
and it denies the trial judge the authority to referee discovery disputes-a
classic district court function.
97
As this Part has demonstrated, the group of lawsuits originally styled
In re September 1 1th Litigation have become five distinct tracks of cases:
the personal injury/wrongful death cases; the property damage cases; the
liability insurance case; the on-site respiratory damage cases; and the off-
site respiratory cases. These cases are in addition to the lawsuits and
94. See In re Sept. II Prop. Damage & Bus. Loss Litig., 468 F. Supp. 2d 508, 510-11 (S.D.N.Y.
2006); Indus. Risk Insurers v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 387 F. Supp. 2d 299, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). It
also produced the strange situation in which the very entity for which the city claimed sovereign
immunity, New York City's Office of Emergency Management, was also the target of a new causation
argument and the court authorized a period of limited discovery to create a factual record pertaining to
the sovereign immunity issues. Interpreting the New York Defense Emergency Act, N.Y. UNCONSOL.
LAW §§ 9101-9202 (2007), the court held that the City was entitled to immunity from suit. In re Sept.
II Prop. Damage & Bus. Loss Litig., 468 F. Supp. 2d at 518.
95. See, e.g., In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
10, 2007) (order regulating preliminary discovery proceedings).
96. 49 U.S.C. § 46110 (2000); In re Sept. 11 th Litig., 236 F.R.D. 164, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). See
also 49 C.F.R. § 1520.5 (2006) (defining SSI material).
97. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Logic Without Experience: The Problem of Federal Appellate
Courts, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 97, 130 (2006).
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motions that concerned the VCF. All groups present different legal, factual,
and organizational challenges for the parties and for the court. Each case
and group was brought under the ATSSSA, a statute that supposedly was
passed to bring a speedy and efficient resolution to disputes arising out of
the events of September 11th. No trial on issues of liability has been set in
any action, nor has any proposal for settlement been presented to the court.
The cases remain tied to each other by the statutory jurisdictional mandate
and the liability insurance cap. The following chart summarizes the field of
the September 1 th litigation.
FIGURE 1. SURVEY OF THE 9/11 LITIGATION
= Personal injury and wrongful death claims
* - Respiratory damage claims
Group ATSSSA Plaintiffs
= Property damage claims
= Insurance disputes
Defendants Current Status
VCF Cases Administrative Personal injury/ Fund administrator; Closed.
relief wrongful death Competing
authorized by claimants; claimants to
ATSSSA. Some respiratory decedent funds.
injury claimants.
21 MC 97 Yes. Personal injury and Airlines; airline Motion to dismiss
wrongful death security; WTC denied.
claims of those owners and
injured on September operators
1 1th at the WTC Site, (Silverstein proceed to trial onthe issue of
the Pentagon, and in Properties; damas on
Shanksville, PA. Westfield damages only.
Properties; Discovery
PANYNJ). difficulties as to
issues of liability.
No.
Jurisdiction
excluded by
plain language
of ATSSSA
Personal
injury/wrongful death
claimants.
Terrorists and their
alleged financial
backers.
Cases pending.Lawsuits
against
terrorists
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Part 11 narrated the course of the September I 1th litigation firom late
2001 to 2007. This Part situates the litigation in the context of more
traditional doctrines of federal jurisdiction and federal preemption of state
law causes of action. That is, it hypothesizes how the jurisdictional
questions might have l)laycd out without the ATSSSA, and then examines
exactly how the statute has shaped the contours of the litigation. Part lILA
outlines the trend of congressional and judicial expansion of federal
jurisdiction, and summarizes the possible bases for federal jurisdiction in
the September I Ith cases, focusing on "arising under" jurisdiction and
protective jurisdiction. Part 111.13 introduces the label "event jurisdiction" to
describe the motivating principle behind the federalization of claims arising
from September 1 I th. The concept of protective coord ination introduced in
Part IV requires a carefil evaluation of event jurisdiction, because in order
for Congress to coordinate all cases in a single forum, there must first be
federal jurisdiction over all claims so as to avoid parallel litigation in state
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courts.
A. THE ATSSSA IN CONTEXT: THE TREND TOWARD BROADER
FEDERALIZATION OF FORUM AND SUBSTANTIVE LAW
Many commentators have noted a trend toward federalization of
forum.98 A corollary phenomenon to the federalization of forum is the
federalization of substantive areas of law that had once been state law
claims.99 The ATSSSA is a curious example of both of these trends. The
ATSSSA specifies that the SDNY has exclusive jurisdiction over the
September 11 th cases' 0 but the authority for a grant of federal jurisdiction
is not obvious. While the statute mandates that state law is the applicable
law of all actions brought under it, 10 1 the courts have turned to the doctrine
of complete preemption of state law to uphold the statute's jurisdictional
grant. 10 2 This Part addresses federal question jurisdiction from a different
perspective. Instead of analyzing the scope of jurisdiction granted by the
statute, this Part examines the authority for Congress to grant jurisdiction in
this manner in the first place by exploring the controversial concept of
"protective jurisdiction" in which federal courts have jurisdiction over
nondiverse parties and the rule of decision is state law.
Shortly after Congress passed the ATSSSA, a few commentators
began to identify the jurisdictional provisions of the act as an instance of
protective jurisdiction. 10 3 Despite this academic commentary, the parties to
98. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different Approach to
Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1314 (2004) ("Over the last several years, the Supreme Court
repeatedly has found preemption of important state laws, and done so when federal law was silent about
preemption or even when it explicitly preserved state laws."); Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M.
Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1414 (2006) ("[T]he Rehnquist Court,
despite its federalist billing, has largely been an active promoter of the federalization of large bodies of
substantive law and the law governing forum selection."); Stephen I. Vladeck, The Increasingly
"Unflagging Obligation ": Federal Jurisdiction After Saudi Basic and Anna Nicole, 42 TULSA L. REV.
553, 554 (2007) ("[T]he Court has taken an increasingly skeptical view toward doctrinal or statutory
exceptions to federal jurisdiction .... ").
99. Samuel Issacharoff and Catherine Sharkey argue, for example, that judicially created limits
on punitive damages in state law cases in state courts represents a "partial federalization" of these
regulatory areas. See Issacharoff& Sharkey, supra note 98, at 1420-22.
100. See ATSSSA, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 408(b)(1), 115 Stat. 230 (2001), reprinted in 49 U.S.C.
§ 40101 note (Supp. 1II 2003).
101. Seeid. §408(b)(2).
102. The Second Circuit held that federal jurisdiction exists to the extent that the statute
completely preempts state law. See In re WTC Disaster Site, 414 F.3d 352, 372-75 (2d Cir. 2005);
supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
103. See Segall, supra note 9, at 363-64. See also Andrew C. Baak, Comment, The Illegitimacy of
Protective Jurisdiction Over Foreign Affairs, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1487, 1507 n. 110 (2003); Qian A.
Gao, Note, "Salvage Operations Are Ordinarily Preferable to the Wrecking Ball": Barring Challenges
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the September 11 th litigation have not argued that the federal courts lack
jurisdiction under this doctrine, nor has the district court itself raised the
argument sua sponte. 0 4 In fact, it is not at all clear that the ATSSSA is an
instance of protective jurisdiction. 10 5 The aim of this Article, however, is
not simply to present a doctrinal argument for or against the statute's status
as an instance of protective jurisdiction. Rather, it shows how the problems
that have arisen during the September 11 th litigation as a result of the
ATSSSA's jurisdictional provisions are merely symptoms of a larger,
contentious issue. The inquiry may be instructive of when the use of a
protective jurisdictional statute is most effective. This, in turn, may
illuminate some of the current theories of protective jurisdiction.
The problem of protective jurisdiction emerges from the fact that in
some instances, Congress establishes federal jurisdiction without
identifying a specific underlying federal right or defense,' 0 6 or establishes
federal jurisdiction with a specific mandate that state law will furnish the
substantive rules of decision. 0 7 The Supreme Court first approved this sort
of jurisdictional grant in Osborn v. Bank of the United States,"8 holding
that Congress was authorized under Article III of the Constitution to grant
federal jurisdiction over all cases involving the National Bank, even if the
claim was governed by state law and the parties were not diverse.'0 9 Since
that time, scholars and jurists have debated the rationale and scope of
Justice Marshall's decision in Osborn. 10 The theory used to describe
Congress's power to grant jurisdiction over these cases has come to be
known as "protective jurisdiction,"' 11 a phenomenon that "tends to arise in
situations in which Congress has authorized a federal forum, the accepted
minimum requirements for a case to arise under federal law are not met,
and no other basis for federal jurisdiction can be found under Article III of
to Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2369, 2400 (2005); Erin Elizabeth Terrell, Note,
Foreign Relations and Federal Questions: Resolving the Judicial Split on Federal Court Jurisdiction,
35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1637, 1639 n.5 (2002).
104. Theoretically, any court at any time could consider the basis for federal jurisdiction and
dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
105. See infra notes 120-31 and accompanying text.
106. See Am. Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S. 247, 257 (1992) (upholding federal jurisdiction
over state law claims in which the Red Cross is a party because it as an organization charted by the
federal government).
107. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2210(n)(2) (West 2008). See also Carole E. Goldberg-Ambrose, The
Protective Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 30 UCLA L. REV. 542, 558-65 (1983).
108. Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 824 (1824).
109. Id. at 823.
110. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 107.
Ill. See id. at 542-43; Segall, supra note 9, at 364.
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the Constitution."' 12
Judges and commentators have defined protective jurisdiction
according to a variety of criteria. 11 Some view protective jurisdiction "as a
necessary and proper means of furthering the objects of federal legislative
power identified in [A]rticle L. ''1 4 In other words, the boundaries of
constitutional "arising under" jurisdiction are coterminous with Congress's
legislative power. In the judiciary, Justice Jackson was the main proponent
of this theory in his National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer
Co. plurality opinion." 5 Finding that Congress "has deliberately chosen the
[federal] district courts as the appropriate instrumentality through which to
exercise part of the judicial functions incidental to exertion of
sovereignty"1 6 over the District of Columbia, Justice Jackson concluded
that Congress was appropriately exercising its legislative powers."17
The concurring and dissenting justices argued that Justice Jackson
relied on shaky precedent" 8 due to his use of cases that have "since been
discredited."' 9
Some proponents of this sort of theory argue that the Article I power
to preempt state law necessarily includes the "lesser" power to create
federal jurisdiction. 120
112. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 107, at 546-47.
113. These definitions emerge from consideration of different instances of purported protective
jurisdiction and the reasoning behind judicial approval of federal jurisdiction in each case; thus the
scholarship includes proposed definitions of protective jurisdiction as well as specific constitutional
theories to justify (or argue against) its existence. For example, in a leading article on the subject,
Carole Goldberg-Ambrose identified three major theories of protective jurisdiction: Effectuation
Theory, the Greater Power Theory, and the Partial Occupation Theory. Id. at 583-95.
114. See id. (describing what the author calls the "Effectuation Theory").
115. See Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 588-604 (1949). The Court
considered the constitutionality of an act extending the diversity jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332,
to include jurisdiction over suits between citizens of the District of Columbia and the States or
Territories. Two Justices found that the statute satisfied the constitutional diversity provision by arguing
that the District was a State. Id. at 617-26 (Rutledge, J., concurring). Justice Jackson wrote the other
plurality opinion holding that protective jurisdiction existed. Id. at 583-604 (Jackson, J., plurality
opinion).
116. Id. at 591.
117. Id. ("[U]nless we are to deny to Congress the same choice of means through which to govern
the District of Columbia that we have held it to have in exercising other legislative powers enumerated
in the same Article, we cannot hold that Congress lacked the power it sought to exercise in the Act
before us.").
118. Id. at 610-11 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
119. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 107, at 584.
120. See Herbert Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 216, 224-25 (1948) ("Where.. Congress... can declare as federal law that
contracts of a given kind are valid and enforceable, it must be free to take the lesser step of drawing
suits upon such contracts to the district courts without displacement of the states as sources of the
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Congress echoed these sentiments in the passage of the ATSSSA. The
strongest argument was the threat that the aviation industry would collapse
under the weight of crushing jury verdicts in thousands of lawsuits. 21 This
justification arguably was weakened when Congress amended the statute to
include all defendants in the liability cap including the City of New York
and other ground defendants, entities that attracted little or no attention as
potential subjects of financial collapse. Congress also appeared motivated
to provide a federal stage for the resolution of disputes arising from such a
prominent national tragedy. It is harder, however, to conjure an Article I or
Article III area of competence merely from the fact that the September 11 th
attacks struck at the emotional and political heart of Americans. One could
argue instead that Congress sometimes has an interest in ensuring that a
certain group of cases are litigated together in one forum. In order to
accomplish this, it must first ensure that the federal forum has subject
matter jurisdiction over all relevant causes of action. This provides the
justification for permitting state claims to be litigated in federal court as a
matter of supplemental jurisdiction' 22  or pursuant to bankruptcy
jurisdiction. 123 This raises the question of whether the concept that this
Article labels "protective coordination" is enough of a federal interest to
justify federal subject matter jurisdiction absent any other attendant federal
claim or defense. This question would probably remain largely academic
because any coordination of cases by Congress would likely take place in
the context of a statute addressed at a specific concern, and the analysis
would then return to the federal nature of the underlying problem.
The protective jurisdiction arguments do not end with congressional
intent, however. It might be that the ATSSSA itself provides sufficient
internal logic to escape the label of protective jurisdiction. First, the
creation of the VCF could qualify as satisfying the constitutional
requirements of a theory of protective jurisdiction known as the "Partial
Occupation Theory" which would "limit protective jurisdiction to subject
areas in which Congress has already undertaken some degree of substantive
operative, substantive law." (citation omitted)). Carole Goldberg-Ambrose calls this variation on the
Article I powers theory the "Greater Power Theory." Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 107, at 589. On
this account, cases arise under federal law "whenever Congress has the power to enact substantive rules
to govern them, but chooses instead to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts and rely on state-made
rules." Id.
121. 147 Cong. Rec. H5892 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Rep. Spratt).
122. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000).
123. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2000), which provides in full:
Except as provided in subsection (e)(2), and notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers
exclusive jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall
have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title l1, or
arising in or related to cases under title 1I.
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regulation." 124 Locating the source of authority for protective jurisdiction in
Article III, proponents of this theory argue that this power was justified
when "there is an articulated and active federal policy regulating a
field ... ,,125 Here, protective jurisdiction gives Congress the opportunity
to achieve some degree of uniformity without imposing its own specific
rules of decision. 12
6
By establishing the VCF as a remedy with federally created rules of
decision and administration by a federally authorized Special Master, the
ATSSSA jurisdictional grant is simply a complement to an area in which
Congress has already regulated at the substantive law level. The problem
with this argument is that the ATSSSA jurisdictional grant for lawsuits is
broader than the claims eligible for the VCF. Suits for property damage, for
instance, are explicitly excluded from the VCF. Moreover, the Second
Circuit explicitly held that the personal injury and wrongful death lawsuits
eligible for federal jurisdiction occupied a broader field than those eligible
for VCF claims.' 27 Therefore, it is unclear that Congress actually has
engaged in substantive regulation of the "field" of lawsuits outside those
eligible for the VCF. 128
The second argument for jurisdiction internal to the ATSSSA is that
the liability cap adds an element of substantive regulation to the law, thus
removing it from the realm of "pure jurisdictional statutes." In Mesa v.
California the Supreme Court stated that a "pure jurisdictional statute"
cannot by itself support federal jurisdiction. 129 The statute in question, 28
124. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 107, at 592. See also Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal
"Question " in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 184 (1953) (defining protective jurisdiction
as including cases brought in federal court "where no construction or enforcement of federal law is
required-that is, where the substantive law is not national, but state"). Mishkin thought that Osborn
represented an instance of protective jurisdiction because Congress was justified under the "arising
under" clause of Article III to "use the 'inferior' federal courts as a means of protecting interests around
which it proposes to throw its cloak." Id. at 188. He suggested that the purpose of protective jurisdiction
"would be the protection of some congressionally favored interest by exploiting the institutional
differences between the federal and state courts." Id. at 184.
125. Mishkin, supra note 124, at 192; Segall, supra note 9, at 383 (offering a stronger version of
this theory, suggesting that "Article III authorizes Congress to enact pure jurisdictional statutes if doing
so furthers legitimate Article I concerns").
126. Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process:
The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1957).
127. In re WTC Disaster Site, 414 F.3d 352, 375-76 (2d Cir. 2005).
128. But see O'Connor v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 770 F. Supp. 448, 452 (C.D. 111. 1991)
("[l]t is clear that Congress could have preempted all state law and common law causes of actions
involving nuclear incidents or nuclear power under the commerce clause of Article I, Section 8 of the
United States Constitution as long as Congress provided an alternative remedy for potential plaintiffs."
(citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 87-89 (1978))).
129. Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989) (citation omitted).
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U.S.C. § 1442(a), allows federal employees to remove state court traffic
prosecutions from state to federal court. 130 The Court held that removal was
improper unless the defendants asserted a federal defense. The federal
element could not come from § 1442(a) alone because it "is a pure
jurisdictional statute, seeking to do nothing more than grant district court
jurisdiction over cases in which a federal officer is a defendant; ...
[s]ection 1442(a), therefore, cannot independently support [Article] III
'arising under' jurisdiction."'13 1 The ATSSSA furthers several substantive
goals, most notably, the limitation of liability of the airlines and other
defendants. Thus, it is unlikely that the term "pure jurisdictional statute"
would apply.
In light of these justifications, it is possible that the statute occupies
the murky category of constitutionally permissible protective jurisdiction.
But the real question is, does the existence of the liability cap change the
remedy in such a significant way that it has, in fact, changed the underlying
state law cause of action? The liability cap does not change the remedy per
se; it simply sets an upward limit on the damages available to all litigants.
In this way, the liability cap does not look terribly different from the
federal judicially created limits on punitive damages in state law
lawsuits.'32 On the other hand, one might argue that the real force of
substantive state law regulating primary conduct lies in the ability of states
to enforce these standards through the remedies they impose.
It may also be understood as symptomatic of a growing hostility at the
federal level toward litigation. 133 Congress is authorized under Article III to
grant the federal courts jurisdiction over cases that arise under federal
law. 134 Congress has used this power to create a general grant of
jurisdiction to the federal courts for all cases "arising under the
130. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (2000).
131. Mesa, 489 U.S. at 136.
132. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (holding that "grossly
excessive" punitive damage awards violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
Undoubtedly, the punitive damages issue does not raise the problem of protective jurisdiction because it
is an example of partial federalization in which some sort of federal law limits state law as applied in
state court. See lssacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 98, at 1420-28.
133. See Conk, supra note 33, at 183 n.28; Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts:
Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L.
REv. 1097, 1152-53 (2006) ("[T]he Court has shown its greatest sympathy for federalism doctrines that
protect the states from litigation and has shown almost no interest in developing new doctrines that
provide the states with greater autonomy . .. if [it] could conceivably be used to develop a more
litigation-friendly environment." (citations omitted)). See also Chemerinsky, supra note 98, at 1315
("The Court has eagerly found preemption of state laws regulating business .... [M]ost of [its]
decisions invalidating federal laws have struck down civil rights laws ... .
134. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,"' 135 although this grant
of jurisdiction is narrower than the constitutional limits because the federal
issue must appear on the face of the plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint. 136
Congress can also grant jurisdiction more directly by creating a substantive
federal right or defense, and affirmatively grant federal courts jurisdiction
over its enforcement. 1
37
The ATSSSA prioritizes federal interests by ensuring a federal forum
for the litigation and by shaping the substantive rules of decision.
138
Samuel Issacharoff and Catherine Sharkey provide a useful model for
understanding the interplay of jurisdiction and preemption in the context of
federalism. They suggest thinking of the problem as a two-by-two matrix
with substantive and procedural dimensions. Actions by Congress to "exert
a federal interest" thus can be described as falling into one of four
quadrants: "At one pole are statutes ... in which field preemption of the
substantive law is accompanied by exclusive federal-court jurisdiction....
At the other extreme are Dormant Commerce Clause cases in which the
Court has to define the federal interest in the absence of congressional
action." '139 The ATSSSA falls, for the most part, into "Quadrant II," the
group of cases in which Congress has decided to centralize jurisdiction in
federal courts, but has not established any substantive federal law to
provide the rules of decision. 14
0
One recent illustration of the federalization of jurisdiction is the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA") 14 1 which authorized a substantial
expansion of federal jurisdiction over traditionally state law claims.
CAFA's proponents touted the statute as a national remedy for class action
"abuses" in state courts in which state law procedural devices were blamed
for empowering litigants to bring "nationwide" class actions in states with
plaintiff-friendly law. 142 Obtaining class certification in federal court under
135. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
136. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 14
(1983) ("[A] case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense."); Louisville &
Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (outlining the well-pleaded complaint rule).
137. See §§ 1330, 1333-1365. Other specific grants of federal jurisdiction are "scattered
throughout the United States Code." 32A AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 884 (2007).
138. Congress did not replace state law with a new regulatory regime, but it did change the
application of state law by instituting the liability cap. See infra Part V.C for a reflection on such
liability caps.
139. Issacharoff& Sharkey, supra note 98, at 1357.
140. See id. at 1415.
141. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.) [hereinafter CAFA].
142. See, e.g., NL Roundtable: Class Action Fairness Act, NAT'L L.J., May 16, 2005, at 18
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 is perceived to be a more stringent
standard. The statute allows for easier removal of class actions to federal
court by amending the diversity jurisdiction statute to allow minimal
diversity and a class-wide amount in controversy of five million dollars.14 3
CAFA is an example of a congressionally created widening of federal
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has interpreted existing statutory and
judge-made jurisdictional doctrines to broaden federal jurisdiction. The
Court recently resolved disputes about the scope of diversity jurisdiction, 144
supplemental jurisdiction, 145  and the probate exception to federal
bankruptcy jurisdiction 146 in favor of a broader interpretation of each. In
the realm of arising-under jurisdiction, the Court expanded the Merrell
Dow1 47 doctrine for determining when a well-pleaded complaint stated a
federal cause of action. 148 The Court also narrowed the ability of lower
courts to rely on the Rooker-Feldman 49 doctrine as a tool of dismissing
cases for lack of jurisdiction.15 0
Protective jurisdiction is such a highly charged concept because it sits
at the uncomfortable intersection of federal and state regulatory regimes. It
has been suggested that the Court does a disservice when it perpetuates the
(statement of John Beisner, Partner, O'Melveny & Myers LLP); Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 98,
at 1416 (considering CAFA to reflect "the broader concern about the need for federal oversight of legal
claims that affect the entire national market").
143. CAFA § 4(a)(2) (adding new 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)).
144. See Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 306-07, 318 (2006) (holding that, for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a bank is located in the state where it has its main offices); Lincoln
Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 84 (2005) (upholding diversity jurisdiction when named defendant is
diverse but unnamed prospective defendants are not).
145. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 566-67 (2005) ("[T]he
threshold requirement of § 1367(a) is satisfied in cases ... where some, but not all, of the plaintiffs in a
diversity action allege a sufficient amount in controversy.... [Section] 1367 by its plain
text.., authorized supplemental jurisdiction over all claims by diverse parties arising out of the same
Article III case or controversy, subject only to enumerated exceptions .....
146. Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 299-300 (2006).
147. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
148. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 319-20(2005). This
was a state law quiet title action that involved the interpretation of federal tax laws to determine if
notice by certified mail is adequate. Id. at 311. The Court upheld federal jurisdiction, but confined the
holding to such "rare" state law cases that "involve[] contested issues of federal law" indicating that
"jurisdiction over actions like Grable's would not materially affect, or threaten to affect, the normal
currents of litigation." Id. at 319-20.
149. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts lack jurisdiction to review state
court judgments. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust
Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
150. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292-94 (2005) (holding that
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar proceedings in federal court with proper jurisdiction because
a state court judgment currently exists).
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idea that regulatory and adjudicatory spheres can be neatly divided between
federal and state authority. Lawmakers and judges should instead become
more comfortable with the inescapable reality that there are large "gray
areas" of interjurisdictional competence in both the hypothetical and real
worlds. 15' The role of the courts should be to interpret and mediate this
space so that state and federal authorities can cooperate with certainty.
Under this view, the exercise of protective jurisdiction and the ATSSSA
promotes a sort of coregulation by state and federal authorities. 152 The state
lawmakers retain their interest in defining the primary conduct of actors
within their jurisdiction. The federal lawmakers in turn guard national
interests by providing select litigants with the perceived advantages of a
federal forum and a backstop on remedies that could cripple an industry of
national importance. 153
Others might read the ATSSSA as a more sinister type of
jurisdictional grant. From this perspective, the statute, just like protective
jurisdiction, is merely a way for the federal government to pay lip service
to state regulatory authority while imposing a procedural regime that
radically alters the outcome of lawsuits brought under the state law in
question. The ATSSSA does not purport to change any state law standards
of conduct, rather it consciously adopts them. The federal force is found in
the limitation of liability and the exclusivity of the federal forum. This sort
of "stealth preemption" of state law is in fact more pernicious than a
traditional preemption of state law because "[t]he authors of these
proposals can thus call themselves 'federalists' and can declare that states
remain the font of [relevant state] law [and] [i]t is only by looking
deeper... that one can begin to see how they might interfere with the
states' abilities to enforce and make their own laws."'
' 54
This is the raw nerve that protective jurisdiction touches. It is as if the
commentators who analyze it are simply rehearsing the dogma that
protective jurisdiction by definition must be the adoption of a wholly state
law claim. The constitutional and policy-oriented discomfort, however, has
its source in the intuition that the state law cause of action has somehow
151. See Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the
lnterjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 567-96 (2007),
152. This is consistent with the calls by some academics for the recognition and further use of
multijurisdictional solutions. See Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating
Cases Between Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211, 1226-35 (2004).
153. See Segall, supra note 9, at 391-93.
154. Wendy E. Parmet, Stealth Preemption: The Proposed Federalization of State Court
Procedures, 44 VILL. L. REV. 1, 64-65 (1999) (arguing that federally mandated alterations to state court
procedure are a sort of "stealth preemption" of state law regimes).
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changed by virtue of its transformation into a federal cause of action.
Perhaps protective jurisdiction, then, is just preemption by another name, 155
another form of stealth preemption of state law. As one scholar cautions,
"Stealth preemption, though less visible than substantive preemption, is far
more destructive of our political system, precisely because it is so invisible
and little understood."1
56
B. EVENT JURISDICTION
The jurisdictional puzzles and other practical problems that the
ATSSSA created cannot be attributed entirely to problems of protective
jurisdiction, nor can they be explained by the underlying worries that
motivate criticism of that and other doctrines concerning federal subject
matter jurisdiction. The problem with the ATSSSA is that Congress has
engaged in a different sort of jurisdictional rationale that this Article labels
"event jurisdiction."
In event jurisdiction, Congress has not decided that there is a type of
conduct, or industry, or type of cause of action that is of national
importance and therefore deserving of federal jurisdiction. Instead,
Congress has chosen to designate a certain event as one of national
significance, and therefore in need of federal jurisdiction.
The problem with this approach is that it is unlikely that the event
itself is the reason for lawsuits following thereafter. It is, rather, the harms
that emerge as a result of the event that give rise to the need for legal
recourse. And these harms, though related to and emerging from an event
of national significance, may not themselves be the sort of harms that are
appropriate subjects of national regulation or a federal forum. The
ATSSSA is the first "fully active" instance of event jurisdiction-that is,
Congress has created federal jurisdiction based on an event and this has
been followed by litigation. There are, however, statutory provisions that
under certain circumstances would produce the result of event jurisdiction.
For example, should the country experience a major nuclear attack or
accident, the litigation following such a disaster would take place in federal
court according to a statute that federalizes claims along event jurisdiction
principles. 157
155. See Judith Resnik, Law's Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and
Federalism's Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1631 (2006) [hereinafter Resnik, Law's
Migration] ("Today's foreign affairs preemption has become so broad that it resembles what federal
courts' scholars call 'protective jurisdiction'....").
156. Parmet, supra note 154, at 3 (emphasis added).
157. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2210(n)(2) (West 2008). For a more detailed discussion, see infra notes 243-
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Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, event
jurisdiction is subject to two lines of inquiry: first, whether Congress has
the constitutional authority to grant the jurisdiction in question and, second,
whether it is a good idea as a policy matter to expand federal jurisdiction to
cover the class of cases at hand. Federal diversity jurisdiction is a nice
example of this. Complete diversity is required for subject matter
jurisdiction in ordinary state law cases litigated in federal court.158 For
certain types of cases where Congress wants to ease access to federal
courts, it has established minimum diversity as the standard for meeting the
subject matter jurisdiction requirement.159 Although Congress has the
authority to grant subject matter jurisdiction over cases with minimum
diversity, 160 it is still worth debating whether such grants are sensible as a
policy matter. 161
Expansion of diversity jurisdiction enlarges the number of state law
cases eligible for litigation in a federal forum. Over the past few decades,
scholars have proposed a variety of methods for understanding the
expanding grant of federal jurisdiction, as well as increasing federal
substantive regulation over a field that was traditionally considered an area
of state law.' 62 Most of these theories assert that the emergence of national
markets for consumer products or financial securities, for example, warrant
uniform regulation, or at the very least, a judicial system capable of
producing uniform results in procedure. CAFA, for example, might reflect
the fact that the class action decision of one state court could have "spill-
over effects" on the commerce and laws of many other states.'163
52 and accompanying text.
158. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806).
159. See, e.g., Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1369 (West
2008) (providing for expanded federal jurisdiction over mass accident cases by loosening the diversity
jurisdiction requirements).
160. See, e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365,373 n.13 (1978).
161. For a comprehensive policy discussion of minimal diversity, see C. Douglas Floyd, The
Limits of Minimal Diversity, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 613, 684-92 (2004).
162. See Richard Briffault, "What About the 'Ism'?" Normative and Formal Concerns in
Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1303 (1994) (preferring a structural account of
federalism over a normative or content-based view of the division of authority); Mark C. Gordon,
Differing Paradigms, Similar Flaws: Constructing a New Approach to Federalism in Congress and the
Court, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 187 (1996); Judith Resnik, Afterword: Federalism's Options, 14
YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 465, 485-94 (1996) [hereinafter Resnik, Afterword] (tracking the development
of and debate over boundaries between federal and state authority); Harry N. Scheiber, Redesigning the
Architecture of Federalism-An American Tradition: Modern Devolution Policies in Perspective, 14
YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 227 (1996).
163. See Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 98, at 1371, 1416-17. See also C. Douglas Floyd, The
Inadequacy of the Interstate Commerce Justification for the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 55
EMORY L.J. 487, 490 (2006) (concluding that "(1) Congress has inappropriately attempted to equate the
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Event jurisdiction, however, defies such analysis. At first blush, an
event such as a large-scale catastrophe might appear to be a solid reason for
federalizing causes of action. Catastrophes predictably generate litigation,
and Congress might want to take action to manage the scope of these cases.
Like the legislators after September 11 th, lawmakers in the future might
reasonably believe that by eliminating parallel litigation in federal and state
courts they would increase the efficiency of the litigation. With cases
proceeding in a single court system (and possibly before a single forum),
Congress could reduce the process costs associated with duplicative
discovery, inconsistent rulings, and a lack of uniformity across settlements
and jury awards. Given that postcatastrophe litigation is likely to be both
very extensive and highly visible, packaging the cases together in a federal
forum presumably would mitigate the high procedural costs associated with
sprawling litigation.
It is easy to see the national interest in protecting the aviation industry
from financial collapse in the personal injury and wrongful death cases. But
it is harder to articulate the federal interest in adjudicating a toxic tort that
affects workers local to one state or region. As the workers' respiratory
injury claims demonstrate, not every toxic tort has the "spill-over" effects
to neighboring states that would ordinarily prompt a call for a national
remedy or federal forum. The claims instead allege misconduct in the
supervision of a workplace, the regulation of which falls solidly in the
realm of traditional state functions. To the extent that one might suggest an
enlarged national role for regulation of the workplace torts, these
arguments should be based upon a unified account of workplace safety that
involves national interests, not piecemeal instances of workplace accidents
that capture the national imagination.
Event jurisdiction robs litigants and courts of the ability to discern
state and national interests emerging from various aspects of a tragedy.
Instead of focusing on an analysis of what is appropriately federal and what
alleged adverse interstate commerce effects of what it terms 'interstate cases of national importance'
with the purposes of the Diversity Clause; and (2) Congress has exceeded its powers to the extent it has
attempted to justify the 2005 Act's jurisdiction-expansion provisions as 'necessary and proper' to
achieve the purposes of Constitutional provisions external to Article III itself, such as the Commerce
Clause") (citations omitted); Michael H. Schill, Uniformity or Diversity: Residential Real Estate
Finance Law in the 1990s and the Implications of Changing Financial Markets, 64 S. CAL. L. REV.
1261, 1262-63 (1991) (arguing that "preferences for uniform national real estate law.., seem
especially out of place"). But see Resnik, Afterword, supra note 162, at 482 ("Global trading, national
and transnational companies, national law firms, the Internet, a population of which 17 percent move
annually and of which some 40 percent do not live in the state of their birth-none of these are easily
categorized as belonging either singularly to one state or exclusively to the national government.").
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is appropriately state, event jurisdiction requires courts to engage first in an
act of statutory interpretation. They will be forced to decide what Congress
meant when it defined the event in question, and they will then have to
decide how closely related the lawsuits are to the event. The answers to
these questions may or may not map onto a more logical understanding of
what constitutes an appropriate subject of federal regulation or federal
forum. This might be because Congress itself has not engaged in a
meaningful debate about the implications of expanding federal jurisdiction
because it was focused on the national character of an event rather than the
interstate aspect of conduct to be regulated.
The flaw in this reasoning is that federalization of claims around the
category of a single event is very likely to be both over- and
underinclusive. Event jurisdiction is overinclusive in the sense that it
anticipates that certain cases are related when, as the litigation unfolds, it
turns out that they are not related in a manner that would normally call for
consolidation. As the September 11th litigation has shown, the harms
resulting from a single event produce results that affect different litigants in
different ways. In the event that these federalized claims are in fact
consolidated before a single judge, this might actually slow down rather
than speed up the litigation process, as one group of litigants must step
aside while the judge addresses issues pertaining to other members of the
group. If the cases proceed before different judges, it appears that little has
been gained in the name of procedural efficiency by simply federalizing the
cases. 164 Different trial courts would still require the intervention of an
appellate court to ensure consistent decisions, and without an underlying
substantive federal cause of action, the difficult choice of law problems
might prevent uniformity of outcomes anyhow. 165
Event jurisdiction is also likely to be underinclusive because of
litigants who appear to have only a tenuous relationship to the event in
question, but whose claims are actually related to those litigants whose
claims have already been federalized. This is especially likely to be true
when a catastrophic event produces environmental damage that is far-
reaching both in time and in geography. These are claims that may (or may
not) benefit from consolidation, but are packaged together based on their
relationship to an event, rather than on their relationship to each other. So
164. The exception, of course, is if Congress has created a substantive cause of action or a remedy
that somehow alters the state law regime in a manner that furthers some other interest.
165. CAFA has been criticized for intensifying these sorts of choice of law problems. See Samuel
Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled Law: Choice of Law After the Class Action
Fairness Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1839, 1840-41 (2006).
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long as some cases remain in state court and others are in federal court, the
efficiency gains which Congress had hoped for are lost, and process costs
may in fact increase due to litigation over the scope of subject matter
jurisdiction.
Once the jurisdictional category has been drawn as a rigid rule set in
reference to a single event, the "relatedness" question becomes one of
statutory interpretation, rather than a function analysis of which cases
would benefit from coordination. Statutory interpretation is likely to be
even more difficult in these cases since Congress presumably passes such
legislation in a hasty reaction to a devastating event. 166 The ATSSSA
illustrates this truncated process. As the Second Circuit observed, "[t]he
legislative history is understandably sparse, given the swiftness with which
Congress acted after the events of September 11; there apparently were no
committee reports prior to the ATSSSA's initial passage, and only a
conference committee report prior to the Act's amendment. 167
The indeterminacy of the jurisdictional analysis is evident in the
September 11 th litigation thus far. At the conclusion of its opinion in In re
World Trade Center Disaster Site, the Second Circuit conceded that it did
not have a clear answer to the question of what the jurisdictional
boundaries of this "event" were. As the off-site respiratory injury cases
show, the jurisdictional litigation is already doomed to repetition. Suppose
that the district court or the Second Circuit holds that injuries sustained by
workers clearing debris and cleaning buildings around lower Manhattan but
not directly on the WTC site are not sufficiently related to the events of
September 1 th so as to "arise from" the terrorist attacks as required by the
statute. Such an interpretation of the ATSSSA might be appropriate given
its text and legislative history. The underlying claims themselves, however,
seem to be no different from the on-site cases, save for the fact that they
occurred a few blocks away.' 68
These difficulties expose the problem inherent in federalizing claims
arising out of an event. The only way to avoid extensive litigation over the
boundaries of jurisdiction or to avoid a seemingly arbitrary division of
cases between state and federal court is to federalize an enormous swath of
166. For a broader analysis of the relationship among fear, risk perception, and democratic
governance, see generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE (2005).
167. In re WTC Disaster Site, 414 F.3d 352, 376 (2d Cir. 2005).
168. The one major difference is that the City is not a defendant in many of these cases. The fact
of the City's presence as a defendant, however, hardly seems like an appropriate demarcation for where
federal jurisdiction should end and state court jurisdiction should begin.
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claims normally brought under state law in state court. In doing so, the
federal government may lose the ability to articulate sound policy and
constitutional arguments for the federalization of substance and forum.
IV. PROTECTIVE COORDINATION
The ATSSSA grants a federal forum for the group of cases arising out
of the events of September 11 th and the attendant difficulties with the
boundaries of this subject matter jurisdiction are noted above. The
ATSSSA also dictated the SDNY as a specific venue for the cases and
imposed a liability cap on the damages awarded, thus mandating a
consolidation of all litigation brought under the statute. This Part explores
that intersection between federalization and aggregation.
The first September 11 th cases filed in the SDNY primarily alleged
wrongful death, personal injury, and property damage claims. With only a
few exceptions, most cases were filed in or removed to the SDNY.169 After
Judge Hellerstein was assigned the first filed case, the clerk of the court,
either by his own determination or by request of the parties, referred all
other seemingly related cases to Judge Hellerstein. 170 This means that, for
the most part, the consolidation and coordination of September 11 th cases
occurred ex ante, that is, before any cases were filed. This Part explores the
contrast between this approach and the more conventional ex post approach
in which the litigants or court personnel decide to coordinate a group of
cases after they have been filed. Part IV.A outlines the normal legal tools
for coordinating and consolidating cases for litigation. Part IV.B discusses
the way in which venue is chosen or assigned. Part IV.C introduces the
concept of "protective coordination" to show how the ATSSSA deviates
from these rules and practices by deciding ex ante to coordinate a group of
cases for litigation and specifying in the text of the statute the judicial
district which has exclusive jurisdiction.
A.' THE LAW OF COORDINATION AND CONSOLIDATION
Without an explicit statutory directive such as that found in the
ATSSSA, the process of aggregating cases is more complex. The most
familiar mechanism for aggregating what are, in fact, separate cases in
complex litigation is the possibility of consolidation of multidistrict
litigation for pretrial purposes under 28 U.S.C. § 1407.171 This statute states
169. See supra Part II.
170. For an explanation of the internal transfer procedures of federal district courts, see infra notes
190-91 and accompanying text.
171. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000). The class action lawsuit is the other major tool for organizing
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that "when civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact
are pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any
district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings."'1 72 Under this
statute, the cases involving the common questions of fact are referred to the
JPML, which then decides whether or not to consolidate the cases for
pretrial purposes. 173 This practice is thought to serve the purposes of
judicial economy by avoiding duplicative discovery and motion practice in
different jurisdictions. 174
The JPML consists of "seven circuit and district judges designated
from time to time by the Chief Justice of the United States, no two of
whom shall be from the same circuit., 175 The JPML is responsible for
identifying civil actions pending in different federal courts involving one or
more common questions of fact, 176 determining after briefings and hearings
whether any of those actions should be transferred to a single district for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings, 177 and then selecting the
judge or judges before whom the consolidated pretrial proceedings should
be conducted. 17
8
Section 1407 requires that the individual actions consolidated in a
multidistrict litigation ("MDL") must involve "one or more common
questions of fact .... ,, 179 The JPML has also held that common questions
of law also justify the creation of an MDL. 180 The JPML must choose the
particular district for centralization, 18 1 and must also find that centralization
serves the interest of the parties and witnesses and promotes the just and
efficient conduct of the litigation.' 82 The statute does not articulate a
standard any more specific than these broad interests which effectively
complex litigation in federal courts. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
172. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
173. Id. § 1407(a), (c).
174. U.S. ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 270, 273
(D.D.C. 2002). See also Richard L. Marcus, Reassessing the Magnetic Pull of Megacases on
Procedure, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 468-70 (2001) (summarizing the creation and purpose of the
multidistrict litigation statute).
175. § 1407(d).
176. The JPML may do this on its own initiative, or upon motion of the parties. Id. § 1407(c)(i)-
(ii).
177. Id. § 1407(c).
178. Id. § 1407(b).
179. Id. § 1407(a). See, e.g., In re Ford Motor Co. Crown Victoria Police Interceptor Prods. Liab.
Litig., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1367 (J.P.M.L. 2003).
180. In re Gator Corp. Software Trademark & Copyright Litig., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1380
(J.P.M.L. 2003).
181. Parties often contest which district should be chosen for an MDL.
182. In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 420-22 (J.P.M.L. 1991).
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function as a three-part test.183
The JPML has adopted the practice of classifying its dockets into eight
general category areas: air and common disasters, antitrust, contract,
employment practices, patent and trademark, products liability, securities
law, and miscellaneous. 184 Although these categories are only labels for
administrative efficiency, they present a good picture of how the JPML
understands multidistrict litigation. Actions are mostly consolidated
according to the type of cause of action or a single occurrence and not
arranged around a large event. The September 11 th cases encompass much
more than the category of air and common disaster. Air and common
disaster cases typically involve a group of litigants that were all injured in
the same discrete airplane crash or common carrier accident. The JPML
would probably not expect a products liability case or a toxic tort to be
litigated in the same manner as the wrongful death claims after the crash of
an airplane.
The JPML also has a continuing role in actions where the docket
involves a large number of cases filed over a lengthy period of time. After
the JPML has ordered the initial consolidation, cases filed in other district
courts that appear to be related are referred to the JPML as tagalong
actions. If the panel agrees that the case is related according to the criteria
of the original consolidation, it will transfer the case to join the other for
pretrial consolidation. 185 The respiratory distress claims would probably be
handled in much the same manner had they been consolidated for pretrial
purposes by the JPML in one judicial district. The question of whether the
off-site respiratory plaintiffs ought to join the on-site litigants would be
subject to a much more functional analysis, rather than to a completely
separate and controlling question of statutory interpretation, that is, whether
the claims of the off-site litigants "arose from" the events of September
11 th in the same way as do the claims of the on-site litigants.
For the first thirty years of its existence, consolidation under the
Multidistrict Litigation Act ("MDLA") served as a de facto transfer of all
consolidated cases. Although § 1407 states that "[e]ach action so
transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of
such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred
183. Mike Roberts, Multidistrict Litigation and the Judicial Panel, Transfer and Tag-along
Orders Prior to a Determination of Remand: Procedural and Substantive Problem or Effective Judicial
Public Policy?, 23 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 841, 847 (1993).
184. Nangle, supra note 28, at 342.
185. For example, the JPML oversees the continuing transfer of tagalong actions in "major
ongoing dockets [such as] the asbestos and breast implant products liability litigations." See id.
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unless it shall have been previously terminated,"' 186 transferee courts used
§ 1404 and § 1406 to order the consolidated cases transferred permanently
for trial. This practice drew increasingly sharp criticism from academic
commentators 187 until the Supreme Court specifically barred the practice in
1998.188 Since then, commentators have debated the effectiveness of MDLs
as consolidation tools. One judge, for example, complained that the
Supreme Court "has substantially eviscerated the practice, purposes, [sic]
of the MDL assignments."' 89 The decision underscores the fact that actions
consolidated pursuant to § 1407 are not class actions aggregated for motion
practice and settlement by a multijudge panel instead of a single district
judge pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. They are actions with
more limited commonalities that may require individual trials in different
district courts. In other words, had some of the September 11 th personal
injury and wrongful death cases been consolidated by the JPML, they
might have been transferred back to the Eastern District of Virginia or
another district for trial purposes.
The JPML is the primary vehicle for interdistrict transfer of cases.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) ("Rule 42(a)") provides a
mechanism for intradistrict consolidation.' 90 Because this rule is limited to
cases already pending before a single district, it is unlikely to be applied in
large-scale cases attracting national attention. In addition to the authority
granted under Rule 42(a), SDNY Local Rule 15 sets forth the criteria for
consolidating or coordinating civil cases. The rule states that:
[A] civil case will be deemed related to one or more other civil cases and
will be transferred for consolidation or coordinated pretrial proceedings
when the interests ofjustice and efficiency will be served. In determining
relatedness, a judge will consider whether (i) a substantial saving of
judicial resources would result; or (ii) the just efficient and economical
186. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2000).
187. Practitioners, however, apparently did not question the practice. See Nangle, supra note 28,
at 345 ("The so-called practice of 'self-transfer' has been engaged in for many, many years without any
question from counsel for plaintiffs or defendants.").
188. Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 40 (1998) (holding
that a district court conducting pretrial proceedings pursuant to § 1407 lacks authority to invoke 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a) to assign transferred case to itself for trial).
189. Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1999 and Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 2112 and H.R. 1751 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and
Intellectual Property of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 125 (1999) (statement of John F.
Nangle, Chairman, Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation and United States District Judge, Southern
District of Georgia).
190. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a) ("If actions before the court involve a common question of law or fact,
the court may: (1) join for hearing or trial any or all matters at issue in the actions; (2) consolidate the
actions; or (3) issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay.").
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conduct of the litigations would be advanced; or (iii) the convenience of
the parties or witnesses would be served." 19 1
Local Rule 15 thus provides not only for the more formal "consolidation"
of cases of the type seen in § 1407 or Rule 42(a) actions, but also for a
looser and more informal "coordination" of cases which simply enables a
district judge who is familiar with the facts and issues of one case to
preside over other cases that are more or less related. The effect of such a
local rule is to increase the likelihood that cases consolidated in a single
venue will be litigated before a single judge.
B. THE LAW OF TRANSFER OF VENUE
The ATSSSA specifies the SDNY as the exclusive venue for all
actions filed pursuant to the statute. Normally, in federal practice, venue is
proper in any judicial district in which any defendant resides, if a
substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim
occurred. 192 When an action is brought in an improper venue, the court can
dismiss the case for improper venue, or transfer the case to any district in
which venue is proper. 193 If an action has been brought in a jurisdiction
where venue is proper, a party may still move for a transfer under 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a) which authorizes transfer from a proper venue "[f]or the
convenience of parties and witnesses [and] in the interests of
justice .. .
The party requesting the transfer of venue bears the burden of showing
that a balance of factors weighs in favor of transfer. 95 The district court
judge enjoys broad discretion in deciding whether to grant the transfer. 196
In making its decision, the district court should consider the statute's
"enumerated" factors of convenience of parties, convenience of witnesses,
and the interests of justice. The analysis, however, is not limited to these
factors because "courts have recognized that such determinations require a
case-by-case evaluation of the particular circumstances at hand and a
consideration of all relevant factors."' 197
191. S.D.N.Y. R. 15(a).
192. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)-(b) (2000).
193. Id. § 1406(a).
194. Id. § 1404(a).
195. See, e.g., Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509, 1515-16 (10th Cir.
1991); Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22, 25 (3d Cir. 1970).
196. See, e.g., Filmline (Cross-Country) Prods., Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 865 F.2d 513, 520
(2d Cir. 1989).
197. Terra Int'l, Inc. v. Miss. Chem. Corp., 119 F.3d 688, 691 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing Stewart Org.,
Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988)).
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Several such factors likely would have been considered by a court
faced with a transfer of venue motion in a September 11 th case. As the
Third Circuit has noted, there are both private and public interests to be
considered.'98 Courts have stressed the high importance of respect for the
plaintiffs choice of forum.'9 9 Other factors to be considered include:
[T]he accessibility of witnesses and other sources of proof, including the
availability of compulsory process to insure attendance of witnesses; the
cost of making the necessary proof; questions as to the enforceability of
a judgment if one is obtained; relative advantages and obstacles to a fair
trial; difficulties that may arise from congested dockets; the possibility of
the existence of questions arising in the area of conflict of laws; the
advantage of having a local court determine questions of local law; and,
all other considerations of a practical nature that make a trial easy,
expeditious and economical.2z°
C. PROTECTIVE COORDINATION
The lawsuits brought pursuant to the ATSSSA landed in the SDNY by
specific instruction of the statute itself, not by judges using the standards
for transfer of venue and not by the JPML evaluating a proposed
consolidation of cases for pretrial purposes. That feature of the ATSSSA
has gone virtually unnoticed by practitioners and commentators alike.
Perhaps because Manhattan bore the brunt of the attacks, very few thought
to question the statutory assignment of venue.20 1 It is, however, one of the
most striking features of the statute because it is so unprecedented. Never
before has Congress dictated such a specific venue for such a specific
group of cases. Venue alone, however, has not tied these cases together.
The venue provision in combination with Local Rule 15 practically
guaranteed that the cases would end up before a single judge. It is,
however, the statutory liability cap that ensured that the groups of cases
would remain bound together.
There is little question that before a single action had even been filed,
198. Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir. 1995).
199. See, e.g., Shutte, 431 F.2d at 25 ("It is black letter law that a plaintiffs choice of a proper
forum is a paramount consideration in any determination of a transfer request, and that choice '[s]hould
not be lightly disturbed."' (quoting Ungrund v. Cunningham Bros., Inc., 300 F. Supp. 270, 272 (S.D. Ill.
1969))); Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co. v. Ritter, 371 F.2d 145, 147 (10th Cir. 1967) ("[U]nless the evidence
and the circumstances of the case are strongly in favor of the transfer the plaintiffs choice of forum
should not be disturbed.").
200. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 371 F.2d at 147. See also Terra Int'l, Inc., 119 F.3d at 696; Jumara,
55 F.3d at 879-80; Chrysler Credit Corp., 928 F.2d at 1516.
201. But see Berkowitz, supra note 8, at 25 ("The vesting of exclusive jurisdiction in the Southern
District of New York poses a ... problem.").
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Congress made a conscious decision to consolidate all lawsuits arising out
of the events of September 11 th. Senator Schumer emphasized that "[t]he
intent here is to put all civil suits arising from the tragic events of
September 11 in the Southern District. 2 °2 Senator McCain said "the bill
attempts to provide some sense to the litigation by consolidating all civil
litigation arising from the terrorist attacks of September 11 in one court. 20 3
Senator Hatch announced that he was "pleased that we consolidated the
causes of action in one Federal court." 2 4 The motivation for such
consolidation was clear: consolidating the cases would "provide some
sense" 205  to the litigation, ensure "consistency in the judgments
awarded, '20 6 and make the litigation faster and more efficient overall.
This method of controlling the course of litigation is unique in its
specificity, but it is not entirely detached from previous congressional
action. 20 7 Congress has specified venue through statutory means before. In
addition to the general venue statute, Congress has authorized specific
venue criteria for certain entities or proceedings. 20 8 Sometimes a statute
that creates a federal cause of action will also specify venue. 20 9 The
difference between these statutes and the ATSSSA is that the former
simply outline a standard by describing where venue is proper, thus
narrowing the very broad criteria of 28 U.S.C. § 1391, the general venue
statute. They do not set venue outright by providing a strict rule for a
specific venue.
This Article labels this sort of congressional action "protective
202. 147 CONG. REc. S9592 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Sen. Schumer).
203. Id. at S9594 (statement of Sen. McCain) (emphasis added).
204. Id. at S9595 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (emphasis added).
205. Id. at S9594 (statement of Sen. McCain).
206. Id. at S9595 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
207. The phenomenon of protective coordination (especially as coupled with event jurisdiction) is
not limited to U.S. law. For example, after the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster of 1984, the parliament in
India passed a law creating a special national court to process claims "arising out of, or connected with,
the disaster." The government assumed the claims of all injured parties and the court was given the
powers of a normal civil court. See The Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, No. 21
of 1985 (India).
208. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1394 is the special statute for national banks, stating that "[a]ny
civil action by a national banking association to enjoin the Comptroller of the Currency, under the
provisions of any Act of Congress relating to such associations, may be prosecuted in the judicial
district where such association is located." 28 U.S.C. § 1394 (2000). See also id. § 1391(d) (aliens); id.
§ 1391(e) (defendant is an officer or employee of the United States); id. § 1391(f) (action against
foreign state); id. § 1395 (fine, penalty, or forfeiture); id. § 1396 (Internal Revenue taxes); id. § 1397
(interpleader); id. § 1398 (Interstate Commerce Commission orders); id. § 1399 (partition action
involving United States); id. § 1400 (patents and copyrights); id. § 1401 (stockholder's derivative
actions); id. § 1402 (United States as defendant); id. § 1403 (eminent domain).
209. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2210(n)(2) (West 2008); 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-I to 300aa-34 (2000).
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coordination" because, like protective jurisdiction, it demonstrates a
congressional will to shape the course of certain litigation according to
particular federal interests. It does this by tying together certain causes of
action and ensuring that they will be litigated together in a single district
court, or by tying the outcomes of the cases together with a common
denominator such as the liability cap.
Protective coordination can be understood as a strong form of the
methods Congress employs in order to tie cases together for litigation
purposes. Imagine a spectrum where congressional coordination of
litigation runs from weak to strong. At one end are the very weak tools for
coordinating multiple causes of action such as 28 U.S.C. § 1367
(supplemental jurisdiction), the specific venue statutes listed above, and the
tendency for Congress to concentrate appeals from certain administrative
actions in the D.C. Circuit. These statutes make it likely or even mandatory
that certain types of cases will be filed in the same judicial district, but not
necessarily as a coordinated litigation. In the middle of the spectrum one
finds such tools as 28 U.S.C. § 1407, coordination for pretrial purposes
which was a direct congressional answer to cries for a more efficient means
to prepare large numbers of complex actions for trial or settlement. Other
examples might be the statutory provision which allows a bankruptcy court
to hear causes of action on related matters, 210 the statutory and rule
interpleader options for stakeholder actions, 211  or the Multiparty,
Multiforum Jurisdiction Act.212 These stronger methods of coordination are
tools that Congress has made available to litigants but they do not mandate
coordination. Instead, they encourage the litigation to take shape in a
certain way. The tools of protective coordination are much stronger
because they act to identify a specific type of cases brought by identifiable
litigants and because they specify or narrowly describe the judicial district
in which the lawsuits must be brought. One example of protective
coordination is the jurisdiction provision of the Price-Anderson Act. 2 13 As
210. Interestingly, some commentators believe that this aspect of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction
raises protective jurisdiction problems. See, e.g., Thomas Galligan, Jr., Article III and the "'Related to"
Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A Case Study in Protective Jurisdiction, 11 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 1, 14-
21 (1987) (arguing that "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction raises the problem of protective
jurisdiction). But see Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 107, at 551-58 (arguing that such bankruptcy
jurisdiction is not an instance of protective jurisdiction).
211. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, 2361; FED. R. CIV. P. 22.
212. § 1369 (Supp. IV 2004).
213. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2210(n)(2) (West 2008) ("With respect to any public liability action arising
out of or resulting from a nuclear incident, the United States district court in the district where the
nuclear incident takes place, or in the case of a nuclear incident taking place outside the United States,
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, shall have original jurisdiction without
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noted above, this narrow specification is not a choice that Congress makes
very often.
The ATSSSA illustrates the features of protective coordination:
Congress has identified a distinct class of cases and litigants and has
directed them to a specific forum. Three aspects of the Act reinforce the
strength of the protective coordination effect. First, Congress created a
federal cause of action, ensuring that all lawsuits, not just those amenable
to federal jurisdiction, would be eligible at the outset for consolidation in
one judicial forum.214 Therefore, it is not a coincidence that the ideas of
event jurisdiction and protective coordination are linked in the context of
the ATSSSA; once Congress concluded that all September 11 th litigation
should be coordinated, federalization of all claims relating to that event was
a necessary step. Second, the statute names the SDNY specifically as the
forum for all cases. 215 Third, Congress ensured the coordination of the
cases by limiting the remedy for all cases to the available liability
insurance.216 This liability cap creates a fixed pie of available damages,
tying the claims brought under the statute together almost as if it were an
interpleader action.
One way of thinking about protective coordination is to divide the
tools for coordinating litigation into ex ante and ex post methods. Most
lawsuits are coordinated ex post, that is, after they have been filed. In
protective coordination, the decision to consolidate is made before any
party sets foot in court. The ATSSSA is a stark illustration of how
Congress can achieve an ex ante coordination of cases and the utility of
employing this method of litigation coordination.
This Article does not argue that protective coordination is beyond the
reach of Congress's authority. The ex ante/ex post distinction, however,
raises questions of institutional competence. Just because Congress can
dictate the ex ante coordination of lawsuits does not mean that it is wise for
it to do so.
regard to the citizenship of any party or the amount in controversy. Upon motion of the defendant or of
the Commission or the Secretary, as appropriate, any such action pending in any State court ... or
United States district court shall be removed or transferred to the United States district court having
venue under this subsection.").
214. ATSSSA, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 408(b)(1)-(3), 115 Stat. 230 (2001), reprinted in 49 U.S.C.
§ 40101 note (Supp. 111 2003).
215. Id. § 408(b)(3). The Price-Anderson Act, by comparison, specifies the forum as "the United
States district court in the district where the nuclear incident takes place," making more than one venue
a lawful possibility for jurisdiction after a nuclear incident. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2210(n)(2).
216. ATSSSA § 408(a).
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Another dimension of the ex ante/ex post approach to consolidation is
the degree to which a statute mandates a specific consolidation result. In
the ex ante approach, Congress dictates a rule, subject to little or no
interpretation, and with a mandatory result. In the ex post approach, cases
are consolidated according to a standard that Congress has dictated, and
according to which any number of aggregation and/or venue choices are
possible. This distinction goes beyond a simple.rules/standards dichotomy.
Note, for example, that the ATSSSA gives a rule (venue must be in the
SDNY) whereas the Price-Anderson Act gives a standard (venue must be
where nuclear accident took place), but both mandate a specific judicial
district as a result. Contrast this with the general venue statute in which
venue may be proper in any number of judicial districts. In other words, the
hallmark of the ex post approach is that it delivers a standard under which
multiple parties and institutions with the best information about the cases
negotiate a result which is one of many lawful possibilities.
In the ex post approach, the standards for coordinating cases either by
transfer of venue, intrajurisdictional transfer under Rule 42(a), or
interjurisdictional transfer by the JPML are very fluid. It is not surprising
that, in the end, Congress has directed the judge or panel to approve or
deny a consolidation according to a dynamic balancing test of several
factors, one of them being the malleable "in the interest of justice"
standard. The decision to consolidate cases and the choice of forum for the
consolidation are extremely context sensitive. Judges are in a much better
position to make this decision than Congress because they have the
contours of the existing litigation before them, and because they have the
interested parties as advocates for a variety of positions.
The course of the September 1 1th litigation demonstrates the
weakness in the ex ante approach. In just five years, the September 11 th
cases have mutated from the single designation "In re September 1 1th
Litigation" to five separate tracks of cases, a path that surprised the judge
and litigants alike. 217 Moreover, these tracks of cases do not seem
particularly well-suited to consolidation-that is precisely why they were
broken up in the first place. The legal and factual issues in a complex
aviation disaster turn out to be quite different from those in an
environmental toxic tort, which are, in turn, different from an insurance
dispute. In the ex ante approach, Congress is expected to anticipate the
scope of the cases and the types of harms that will arise out of one event
such as "September 1 1th Terrorist Attack" or one description such as
217. See supra Part 11.
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"nuclear incident." This expectation is quite optimistic given that the
litigants themselves did not realize the full scope of the cases until a few
years after the event in question. A poorly informed judgment about the
scope of consolidation may also carry some costs. Once a group of cases
has started to proceed before a certain judge it may be costly to break off
one or more groups of cases and transfer them to another judge or another
judicial district which must then familiarize itself with the case. In other
words, a faulty ex ante aggregation by Congress may fail to deliver on
reducing process costs, and, in fact, may burden litigants and the courts
with the additional costs of"disaggregation."
The nature of toxic tort cases further dampens Congress's ability to
accurately foresee the scope of litigation and the advisability of
consolidation. Toxic tort cases necessarily involve complex theories of
causation that differ from plaintiff to plaintiff. They present novel scientific
problems. Most importantly, the existence of a toxic tort at all might not be
apparent until months or even years after the incident in question. The
September 11 th cases demonstrate that the largest number of plaintiffs may
not appear until well after the some litigation for harms arising out of an
event has already commenced.218 In that case, the latent nature of the harm
effectively excluded them from the VCF, leaving the plaintiffs only with a
litigation option that Congress explicitly meant to discourage. In some
cases latent harms might not appear for even longer. For example, the
harms to pregnant women may not be apparent until well after their
children have been born.
The September 11 th cases also show the difficulty of consolidating the
cases before one judge. The ATSSSA itself does not mandate this result,
but the statute worked in tandem with the local SDNY rules to create this
predictable outcome. Having designated all cases arising out of the events
of September 11 th as one federal cause of action, it is not surprising that
court personnel assumed that all actions so filed were related with little
thought otherwise. Once assigned, the judge must administer a heavy load
of cases. The burden is not so much in numbers-many judges do a
remarkable job of administering large MDLs over very long periods of
time.21 9 The difficulty is instead that the judge must direct his attention to
many different cases with strikingly different needs and organizational
complexities. Moreover, even assuming that the groups of cases share
218. See Eggen, supra note 31, at 421-24.
219. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (hearing
suit brought by Vietnamese nonprofit organization and Vietnamese citizens against chemical
manufacturers, consolidated before Judge Weinstein).
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many issues of fact and law with each other, it remains a fact that a judge
can, as a practical matter, only manage one trial at a time. District judges
have other cases on their docket that require trial time, most notably,
criminal defendants with speedy trial rights. Therefore, the groups of cases
might wait an even longer time for trial than would normally be expected.
This is evident in the September 1 th cases. A September 11 th insurance
coverage dispute has already gone to trial,22 and a few actions filed after
Hurricane Katrina have gone to trial.221 Yet the cases filed pursuant to the
ATSSSA are not even close to trial.222
Finally, judges will be left with the task of interpreting the statute that
mandates consolidation. Some aspects of this might be very clear, such as
the choice of SDNY as the forum. Others, however, could be very
ambiguous, such as the designation of the class of cases. The interpretive
problems described in Part II.B apply with equal force to the problem of
protective coordination: the answer to the question, Which cases did
Congress mean to consolidate? might be very different from the answer to
the question, Which cases does it make sense to consolidate?
Judges and litigants also have the luxury of time to craft nuanced and
creative solutions to the organization of complex litigation. Congress, in
creating a consolidation ex ante, is unnecessarily acting hastily, passing a
bill with even less scrutiny and debate than normal. This is yet another
institutional deficiency.
The success of the ATSSSA's protective coordination goal can be
measured by the standards of those who wrote the statute. The record
shows that Congress wanted to consolidate these cases because that would
provide the most efficient resolution and would ensure consistency in
awards. Judged on its own terms, the ATSSSA has been, at best, equally
effective at achieving these goals as traditional consolidation methods
might have done, and it has most likely made things worse.
The choice to federalize all causes of action might have been an effort
220. See Dean Starkman, Jury's Decision Leaves Rebuilding of World Trade Center in Turmoil,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 2004, at A1; Dean Starkman, Jury Rules for Silverstein on Trade Center
Insurance, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 2004, at A11.
221. Judge Senter in the Southern District of Mississippi has already conducted one trial in one of
the consolidated actions regarding denial of coverage by insurance companies. See, e.g., Mitchell F.
Crusto, The Katrina Fund: Repairing Breaches in Gulf Coast Insurance Levees, 43 HARv. J. ON LEGIS.
329, 329-39 (2006) (providing an overview of Hurricane Katrina insurance litigation); Allen Kanner,
Louisiana Insurance Litigation Following Katrina and Rita, I ANN. 2006 ATLA-CLE 589 (2006)
(same).
222. It is important to remember that other factors contribute to this situation, namely, the
discovery difficulties caused by SSI procedures. See supra Part II.E.
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to ensure consistency in the litigation process and awards, but it is not clear
that this has been effective. The courts have been occupied with tricky
jurisdictional issues that have delayed the start of discovery and
organization of the group. It might turn out that, in the end, some cases that
look very related to the respiratory distress cases are litigated in state court
anyway. If this is not true, and a vast number of these cases remain before
Judge Hellerstein, this might be at a high cost to some basic federalism
values.
The choice to dictate the SDNY as venue has had, at best, a neutral
effect on the litigation. For many lawsuits, the SDNY was probably the
obvious choice of forum, but the victims of the attacks came from many
other states and countries. 223 Even if the lawsuits brought by these personal
injury and wrongful death plaintiffs were consolidated for pretrial
purposes, the recent Supreme Court ruling makes it more likely that they
still might have been able to litigate a good portion of the case in the forum
of their choice. 224 Finally, the ATSSSA itself mandates that "[t]he
substantive law for decision in any such suit shall be derived from the law,
including choice of law principles, of the State in which the crash
occurred ....225 Because this involves three states, it may be that the
JPML or a judge considering transfer of some cases would conclude that
the questions of law are not uniform enough for consolidation. 226
For others, it is unlikely that the process of transferring some personal
injury/wrongful death cases from the Eastern District of Virginia (Pentagon
cases) would have been particularly onerous. Some of the respiratory
distress cases might have been filed in the Eastern District of New York or
223. As one commentator has observed, "Convenience, in the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
has always been a part of venue determinations. The September 11 attacks involved travelers from all
over the country, yet Congress did not consider the difficulties many of the families would face
participating in lengthy trials in New York City." Berkowitz, supra note 8, at 25.
224. See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
225. 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2000).
226. For example, Virginia law allows hedonic damages for pre-impact emotional distress,
whereas New York law does not. Compare Gonzalez v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 572 N.E.2d 598, 600-
01 (N.Y. 1991) (restricting recovery to "pecuniary injuries") with 17B MCKINNEY'S CONSOLIDATED
LAWS OF N.Y. ANN., ESTATES, POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-3.2(b) (2001). The problem of uniformity
of law at the nexus of federalization of forum and aggregation of claims is not unique to this situation.
As several commentators have noted, CAFA has presented similar difficulties. See generally
Issacharoff, supra note 165; Daniel R. Karon, "How Do You Take Your Multi-state, Class-action
Litigation? One Lump or Two? " Infusing State Class-action Jurisprudence into Federal, Multi-state,
Class-certification Analyses in a "CAFA-nated" World, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 567 (2006); Edward
F. Sherman, Class Actions After the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1593 (2006);
Patrick Woolley, Erie and Choice of Law After the Class Action Fairness Act, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1723
(2006).
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the District of New Jersey. If anything, the exclusive jurisdiction of the
SDNY led the parties and court personnel to an immediate conclusion of
relatedness of cases that resulted in the consolidation of all of these cases
before a single judge, not just a single district.
The choice to establish the liability cap might be the most damaging
decision of all, for this has tied the cases together in resolution as well as in
litigation. The resolution of a toxic tort that affects a large number of
plaintiffs over a long period of time will have very different trial and
settlement dynamics than an air and common disaster where both plaintiffs
and damages are known.227 Despite this, all litigants are forced to divide
the same pie. This has had the overall effect of slowing down the litigation,
not making it speedier or more efficient.228
V. LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
The September 1 th litigation experience shows that there are lessons
to be learned from the ATSSSA aside from the debates over the propriety
of any future compensation fund such as the VCF. This Article has
evaluated the Act as an overall statutory response to the specter of litigation
in the wake of a large disaster. This Part draws together the specific
problems of the ATSSSA with the larger concepts of protective
coordination and event jurisdiction to suggest a framework for how
Congress should consider drafting this sort of legislation-if at all-in the
future. In this Part, some more recent experiences in postcatastrophe
litigation from Hurricane Katrina229 are used as a counterpoint to the
September l1th experience. While these events are not completely
analogous, there are several similarities from the perspective of postdisaster
litigation worth examining because the Katrina litigation provides a
noteworthy window into the course of postdisaster litigation that is
proceeding in the absence of any event-based Congressional action
coordinating the litigation by assignment of venue or federalization of
claims. 2
30
227. For a more detailed discussion of examples of liability cap design from other federal statutes,
see infra Part V.C.
228. It will be interesting to see whether the bifurcated trial on damages in only six of the personal
injury/wrongful death cases will do anything to advance the overall resolution of that track of the
litigation. See supra note 27.
229. For purposes of this Article, the focus remains on Hurricane Katrina, and avoids the question
of whether Hurricane Rita might have been a separate "event." Litigation that concerns both hurricanes
is noted throughout.
230. The catastrophes of September 11 th and Hurricane Katrina are events that deserve to be
analyzed on their own terms, and this Article does not purport to equate the very different dimensions
and experiences of devastation and suffering that each event caused. It is, in fact, one of this Article's
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A. REFLECTIONS ON THE ABSENCE OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON
POSTDISASTER LITIGATION MATTERS
One possibility for a congressional response is for Congress not to act
with respect to the litigation options for victims of a national catastrophe.
Plaintiffs would be left to pursue traditional state and federal remedies
unaltered by an event-specific statute, or a statute dictating the aggregation
of claims. This approach has the advantage of avoiding the jurisdictional
and organizational challenges that the ATSSSA has created in the
September 11 th litigation. On the other hand, the lawsuits would be spread
across a number of federal and state jurisdictions and this may lead to the
familiar problems of duplicative discovery, inconsistent applications of
law, and inconsistency in awards or settlements. The JPML could be called
upon to consolidate like cases in one district for pretrial proceedings but
could not alter the allocation of cases in both federal and state courts. It is a
difficult counterfactual question to imagine whether these problems would
be more of a hindrance in the September 11 th litigation than the problems
caused by the ATSSSA. The Hurricane Katrina litigation, however,
provides a picture of how multijurisdictional postdisaster litigation looks.
The post-Katrina litigation is multijurisdictional, taking place across
three states and at the federal and state level. Since Mississippi, Louisiana,
and Texas were all hit by the hurricane, it is not surprising that plaintiffs
filed lawsuits in their home jurisdictions. 231 The cases filed include class
principal contentions that all catastrophic events are disastrous in their own way. The following
similarities highlight only what is comparable from a postdisaster litigation perspective. Both events
were sudden disasters, but only arguably unexpected-that the World Trade Center was a terrorist
target and that a powerful Hurricane could hit the Gulf Coast were not unknown possibilities. Both
caused shocking loss of human life, personal injury, and severe property damage. Both were initiated by
forces that are more or less beyond the reach of a litigation remedy-the terrorists and their backers
who orchestrated September 11 th and the forces of nature that produced the Hurricane. Suing the
terrorists and their financial backers has proved remarkably difficult. And although one might find it
rather counterintuitive to "sue the weather," there is indeed a class action lawsuit pending against oil
companies for actions leading to the global warming alleged to have produced the Hurricane of such
striking force. See Comer v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 1:05 CV 436-LTD-RHW (S.D. Miss. Feb.
23, 2006).
Moreover, causation of the damage in each event is riddled with intervening or contributing actions
of third party actors well within the reach of litigation. The alleged negligence of the aviation
defendants and WTC owners and operators in the case of September 11 th, and the weak levee in New
Orleans are only the most obvious examples.
Finally, both were undisputedly "national" events. Although the damage to person and property
was local in each case, the whole nation felt the economic and political consequences of each.
Moreover, coverage of the aftermath captivated the public's attention and prompted an outpouring of
charitable relief. The backdrop for litigation was thus set after each event: a large number of parties
would seek redress for a wide variety of claims following an event that played out on the national stage.
231. One commentator has noted the effect of geography on the nature of claims filed:
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actions, individual actions, and individual actions consolidated in a
particular venue for pretrial coordination. The litigation thus far has
concerned tort claims and actions against insurance providers for coverage
of damage sustained as a result of the storm. There is a possibility that, as
in the case of the September 1 th litigation, a "second generation" of toxic
tort cases will emerge in the more distant aftermath of the hurricane.
Possible claims include those brought by plaintiffs seeking compensation
for damage to person and property caused by the mold that has flourished
in the affected areas. 232 Landfills and debris removal programs are another
potential source of environmental hazard and future litigation.233
At present, the claims emerge from several different groups of
plaintiffs who have identified different types of damages and different
sources of harm. Many of the lawsuits involve damage allegedly caused by
the failure of the levees and floodwalls. Cases were filed in state and
federal court, and defendants removed most of the state cases to the Eastern
District of Louisiana.234 The en banc court of that district determined that
all related cases should be consolidated before Judge Stanwood R. Duval,
Jr. and bear the caption In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated
Litigation.
235
Despite the consolidation, the issue remains multijurisdictional
Mississippi's southern counties directly abut the sea, with no man-made barriers to
separate them from the 30-foot storm surge that moved ashore. Residential areas, gambling
barges, hotels, and small towns simply collapsed under the blow. Primary litigation issues
there involve who will pay to repair the damage caused by an act of nature alone-largely
disputes with insurers over coverage.
Louisiana presented different geography and industries. Man, not nature, played a far
larger role. Consequently, the tort system occupies a far greater role in sorting out the
question of who will pay.
John P. Manard, Jr., Patrick O'Hara & Kelly R. Blackwood, Katrina's Tort Litigation: An Imperfect
Storm, 20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 31, 31 (2006).
232. See id. at 37 ("[lI]t would not be surprising to see mold litigation in future years based upon
the contention that the steps taken to eliminate mold proved to be inadequate, thus exposing people to
harmful mold in the air. Landlord/tenant situations would seem to provide the more likely scenarios.
Commercial enterprises could also be at risk for exposure of employees or customers.").
233. See id. ("[Sluch large-scale waste disposal in this type of wetlands environment might well
be expected to involve waste sites that will generate litigation in future years, particularly if the areas
around them are repopulated.").
234. Borders v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Co., No. 07-5399 (E.D. La. Nov. 8, 2007).
235. See United States District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, Katrina Canal Breaches
Consolidated Litigation, Introduction, at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/canalcases/intro.htm (last visited
Jan. 2, 2008). The consolidated cases concern damages involving the 17th Street Canal, the London
Avenue Canal, the Industrial Canal, and the Mississippi Gulf River Outlet. The court identifies two
factors as common among all of the claims: "[Tihe recourse sought involves a determination as to
whether the failing of a specific levee or levees was caused by negligent design, construction or
maintenance. A corollary to this issue is whether the water damage exclusion in all-risk insurance
policies apply to these damages." Id.
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because there is no federal statute like the ATSSSA to grant federal
jurisdiction and specify venue. Therefore, many of these cases remain in
state court. The judges and litigants recognize, nonetheless, the importance
of coordination "to reduce needless duplication and streamline
discovery." 236 As a result, Judge Duval is involving the state court judges
in the relevant federal proceedings. They have attended status conferences
and have "recognized the efficacy of creating coordinating discovery and
agreed.to review the proposed schedule, comment thereon to this Court,
and with its adoption by this Court, to present the First Discovery Plan to
their respective en banc courts for possible adoption." 237 As of the writing
of this Article, this cooperation between state and federal court in this
disaster litigation is just beginning. The results for coordination of efforts
within the context of the traditional federal division of cases look
promising.
The Katrina experience thus far shows that a status quo approach to
postdisaster litigation does not guarantee chaos in the litigation
environment. Postdisaster litigation may be seen as one of many contexts in
which judges and lawmakers must navigate solutions to the reality that in a
federal system of dual sovereignties there will be overlapping adjudicative
efforts. 38 The answers here lie in creative approaches to interjurisdictional
cooperation. 239 The Hurricane Katrina litigation will inevitably have its
own surprises and difficulties. It will not, however, be plagued with the
236. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., No. 05-4182 (E.D. La. Jan. 11, 2007). The court
further noted that "any discovery concerning the United State[s] Government must ultimately be
overseen by this district court" and that "the overall cost of this litigation could be greatly diminished
by establishing certain protocols, creating discovery depositories and allowing discovery conducted in
the federal litigation to be used in the state court proceedings .... Id.
237. Id.
238. See Resnik, Afterword, supra note 162, at 498 ("That state and federal courts overlap to a
large extent is not surprising when one remembers that courts' dockets reflect the overlapping work of
the state and federal governments.").
239. A number of commentators have written about the possibilities of cooperative federalism in
the judicial context. See, e.g., Ralph 1. Lancaster & Catherine R. Connors, Creation of a National
Disaster Court: A Response to "Judicial Federalism In Action," 78 VA. L. REv. 1753 (1992); Resnik,
Afterword, supra note 162, at 468-69 (describing cooperative federalism efforts and noting that "[t]he
practice of these judges and lawyers ... all crisscross state and federal lines but are not in focus in
United States legal federalism"); Judith Resnik, History, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts:
Changing Contexts, Selective Memories, and Limited Imagination, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 171 (1995);
William W. Schwarzer, Alan Hirsch & Edward Sussman, Judicial Federalism: A Proposal to Amend
the Multidistrict Litigation Statute to Permit Discovery Coordination of Large-Scale Litigation Pending
in State and Federal Courts, 73 TEX. L. REv. 1529 (1995) (proposing inter alia to amend the
multidistrict litigation statute to provide for limited removal of state court cases to federal court for
coordinated discovery procedures); William W. Schwarzer, Nancy E. Weiss & Alan Hirsch, Judicial
Federalism in Action: Coordination of Litigation in State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REV. 1689
(1992) (detailing several recent examples of cooperative federalism in complex litigation).
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problems that the jurisdictional aspects of the ATSSSA have caused in the
September 11 th litigation.
The status quo approach by itself also means, however, that two of
Congress's concerns from the aftermath of September 1 1th remain
unaddressed: a need to show a "national" response to victims of a national
tragedy, and the need to relieve a sensitive industry from potentially
crippling liability. It is possible, however, for Congress to address these
concerns without altering the status quo of litigation options. It is possible,
for example, to imagine that the ATSSSA had retained the VCF entirely
while remaining silent about the content of the litigation options. It is also
possible to envision different ways in which Congress could have
approached the perceived problem of liability of the aviation defendants,
for example, by providing tax cuts, direct industry subsidies, or by having
the U.S. government itself assume vicarious liability for all damages. 240
B. LESSONS ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF FORUM AND UNDERLYING
SUBSTANTIVE CAUSES OF ACTION
When Congress passed the ATSSSA it was believed that the creation
of an exclusive federal forum would bring with it certain benefits of speed
and efficiency.241 The September 11 th litigation has shown that this tactic
can create problems of its own. To the extent that Congress still wants to
provide a federal forum or to ensure that all claims would be litigated at the
federal and not state level, the ATSSSA experience points to some
suggestions for less problematic ways to achieve those goals.
Future statutes should be drafted to avoid the problems of event
jurisdiction. Although a specific event might be the impetus for Congress
to pass the legislation at issue, it should resist the urge to use that event as a
blanket basis for federal jurisdiction. Instead, the statute itself should
address specific classes or types of claims. This sort of drafting should
force legislators to decide and articulate up front exactly what sort of
lawsuits they wish to take place in a federal forum, and should help avoid
the problems of line-drawing that judges have experienced in attempting to
determine the proper boundaries of jurisdiction in the September 11 th
respiratory injury cases. One strategy might be to have the jurisdictional
categories outlined in the legislation align more closely with the underlying
categories of substantive law of the claims to be federalized. Furthermore,
240. This is the government's strategy in statutes addressing other areas of public health or
disaster management. See infra notes 243-56 and accompanying text.
241. See 144 CONG. REC. S9595 (statement of Sen. Hatch), supra note 204 and accompanying
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when authorizing a federal forum in such cases, legislators should also
remain keenly aware of the problem of protective jurisdiction. Although an
event is itself a poor organizing concept for determining the boundaries of
jurisdiction, an event of national importance and its aftermath may be
useful in articulating or justifying a federal basis of jurisdiction while
retaining state law for the substantive rules of decision.
Additionally, legislators should consider seriously whether a very
specific venue provision such as the SDNY mandate from the ATSSSA is
necessary. This Article has demonstrated the perils of such ex ante
decisions to consolidate litigation in one judicial district. To the extent that
it would make sense to litigate certain claims together, the parties and
district judges can avail themselves of JPML procedure to attain a
consolidation in one district for pretrial purposes. In the event that
Congress once again passes such a venue mandate, it will become
important for the district court judges and personnel to be aware of how
this statutory scheme interacts with the local rules. This Article has shown
how the combination of the ATSSSA venue provision with the SDNY local
rules led to an assignment of many tracks of cases to one judge as
"related," when it turns out that they were not necessarily so. The court
personnel should be particularly attentive to issues of relatedness in these
sorts of cases.
One way for Congress to ensure that a future statute is not vulnerable
to attack on protective jurisdiction grounds is to infuse the law with more
substantive measures.2 42 As the ATSSSA shows, it is possible for Congress
to alter parties' substantive rights in litigation without creating completely
new causes of action.
There is already a substantial debate about how much, if at all, the
federal government ought to alter the traditional state law remedies
available to litigants in ordinary litigation. These considerations would
surely play a role in the design of any substantive law measures. The
contribution of this Article, however, is to note that such substantive
additions should be crafted to avoid the litigation problems that have arisen
in the September 11 th litigation.
In addition to any lessons about substantive remedies, it is here at the
intersection of federalization of forum and federalization of substantive law
that the nexus between event jurisdiction and protective coordination is
most apparent. When Congress desires for a group of cases to be litigated
242. See supra Part II.
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together, it will first need to create an exclusive federal cause of action to
ensure complete aggregation. If aggregation of cases is the motivating force
behind this federalization, then it is not surprising that Congress would use
the language and thought process behind aggregation to shape the contours
of the federalization of forum. The experience of the September 1 1th
litigation, however, demonstrates the ways in which the desire to aggregate
cases around the causation concept of an event creates a problematic
jurisdictional category.
C. REFLECTIONS ON THE USE AND DESIGN OF LIABILITY CAPS
The September 11 th litigation has shown how problematic a blanket
liability cap on damages can be, especially when it is combined with the
amorphous group of cases defined by an event jurisdiction concept. The
lesson from the liability cap experience is this: Congress should avoid
employing substantive remedies that have the effect of tying together large
and potentially unforeseen groups of cases. If legislators have determined
that a certain event necessitates the limitation of liability in a particular
industry, these liability limitations should be tailored to meet that purpose
only. And if legislators favor a broad-scale liability cap with the potential
of tying disparate groups of cases together, they should more thoroughly
consider the options for handling the problem of future claimants.
1. Industry- or Claim-specific Liability Caps
A few examples of industry- or claim-specific liability caps exist, as
well as liability cap schemes that are more event-oriented. The Price-
Anderson Act sets out a liability cap scheme that most resembles the
ATSSSA, and like the ATSSSA, its aim is to control potentially unwieldy
litigation in the wake of a catastrophic event. 243 Price-Anderson is a useful
comparison both in its current form and in terms of various proposals that
have been made to amend its liability cap provisions.
Like the ATSSSA, the Price-Anderson liability cap scheme is based
on a combination of capped private liability against a background of
government contribution and a process for expedited processing of victims'
claims. Liability is limited to a set amount of liability insurance that nuclear
contractors are obligated to purchase, plus a guaranteed indemnification by
the U.S. govemment. 244 Although the Act serves to put a distinct dollar
243. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2210(e) (West 2008).
244. Id. § 2210(b)(1)(C) (including a scheme for retroactive or "deferred" premiums for
secondary private insurance that is purchased if the primary insurance is exhausted after a nuclear
event).
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limit on the total amount of damages recoverable after a nuclear incident,
particularly from private sources, it also contains an express provision that
Congress would revisit the extent of private liability and public
contribution in the event of an actual nuclear incident. 245 Finally, the Act
was the context in which the Supreme Court had the opportunity to
definitively confirm Congress's power to legislate a liability cap for
damages arising out of a nuclear disaster because it "provide[s] a
reasonably just substitute for the common-law or state tort law remedies it
replaces." 24
6
Although the Price-Anderson Act has grounded lawsuits arising out of
small-scale accidents at nuclear facilities, the statute remains untested as a
method of managing the administrative complexities of mass tort litigation,
or whether various classes of litigants under the Price-Anderson Act would
encounter difficulties similar to what the ATSSSA plaintiffs now face. The
Supreme Court recognized the problem of accommodating a large number
of claimants in a postdisaster litigation scenario in Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc. Congress's consideration of this
problem, in fact, was one factor motivating the Court to approve the
legislated liability cap.2 47  The Court quoted the legislative history
extensively:
[A] defendant with theoretically 'unlimited' liability may be unable to
pay a judgment once obtained. When the defendant's assets are
exhausted by earlier judgments, subsequent claimants would be left with
uncollectable awards. The prospect of inequitable distribution would
produce a race to the courthouse door in contrast to the present system of
assured orderly and equitable compensation.
248
The September I 1th litigation exposes the flaw in this reasoning.
Although a liability cap would serve to curtail a race to the courthouse
among known victims, it does nothing to accommodate the needs of an
unknown class of future claimants. Moreover, the specter of future
245. Id. § 2210(e)(2) ("[T]he Congress will thoroughly review the particular incident in
accordance with the procedures set forth in subsection 170(i) of this section and will in accordance with
such procedures, take whatever action is determined to be necessary (including approval of appropriate
compensation plans and appropriation of funds) to provide full and prompt compensation to the public
for all public liability claims resulting from a disaster of such magnitude.").
246. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 88 (1978). This ruling is
generally thought to affirm Congress's power to use liability caps to regulate tort claims and has been
cited as the authority for Congress to do so in the ATSSSA context.
247. Id. at 90.
248. Id. (quoting To Amend and Extend the Price-Anderson Act: Hearing on H.R. 8631 Before the
J. Comm. on Atomic Energy, 94th Cong. 69 (1975) (statement of William A. Anders, Chairman, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission)).
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claimants produces the gridlock in settlement seen in the September 11 th
claimants. The Price-Anderson answer to the problem of future claimants is
a statutory provision (again, noted with approval by the Supreme Court)
that "no more than 15% of the [liability] limit can be distributed pending
court approval of a plan of distribution taking into account the need to
assure compensation for 'possible latent injury claims which may not be
discovered until a later time . . ,"'249 Future statutes with a liability cap
like the ATSSSA would do well if, at a minimum, they contained the 15
percent rule found in the Price-Anderson Act.
It is also worth reconsidering some of the proposals for managing
liability caps that have arisen in the context of Price-Anderson, but that
were never adopted. For example, in 1983 the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission proposed eliminating the aggregate liability cap with an
annual limit on liability, whereby "each large reactor licensee would be
subject to annual assessments, to be paid until all public liability had been
satisfied .... ,,250 Another proposed amendment to the Price-Anderson Act,
offered by Senator Stafford in 1987 was to eliminate the liability cap
altogether, and replace it with an obligation of the federal government to
indemnify all liability above the levels that had previously been part of the
liability cap; doing so would, in effect, stipulate a postaccident procedure
whereby Congress could draw on a variety of sources besides federal funds
to fulfill this obligation.2 5 1
In addition to the strengths and weaknesses seen in the liability cap
model from the Price-Anderson Act, a few other statutory models exist.
The Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act ("PREPA")
immunizes designers and manufacturers of countermeasures that are used
during a period designated by the Secretary of Health as a "public health
emergency" or "threat" of a future emergency. 252 This statute is addressed
to "all claims for loss caused by, arising out of, relating to, or resulting
from the administration to or the use by an individual of a covered
countermeasure." 253 PREPA is primarily an administrative remedy scheme;
litigation is available only in narrow situations in which plaintiffs allege
"willful misconduct," and the statute grants the District Court for the
249. Id. at 92 (quoting § 22 10(o)(1)(C)).
250. Dan M. Berkovitz, Price-Anderson Act: Model Compensation Legislation?-The Sixty-Three
Million Dollar Question, 13 HARV. ENVT'L L. REv. 1, 18 (1989).
251. Id. at 33, 33 n.148.
252. Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 247d-247d-6d(b)(1)
(West 2008) [hereinafter PREPA].
253. Id. § 247d-6d(a)(1).
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District of Columbia exclusive jurisdiction over such claims.254 PREPA is
an example of how Congress can respond to certain disasters without the
full use of protective coordination or event jurisdiction concepts that
shaped the ATSSSA. Although PREPA is tied to a certain event, a national
health emergency, jurisdiction is based on a type of claim as well-the
covered countermeasures. 255 Moreover, Congress has decided to protect the
industry in question with immunity and an administrative remedy for
victims. Although this method may be subject to other sorts of criticisms in
the realm of tort reform, 256 it avoids the litigation and jurisdictional
difficulties that a liability cap would produce.
A second example is the Y2K Act.257 Congress passed this statute in
anticipation of widespread problems relating to computer compliance and
readiness at the millennium. 258 Legislators were persuaded that major
upsets in computer functioning could lead to unchecked litigation and
enormous liabilities in certain industries. 259 The statute is replete with
liability limitation measures such as limitations on punitive damages, 260
economic loss,2 6 1 and special pleading and notice requirements. 262
What distinguishes PREPA and the Y2K Act from Price-Anderson is
that the liability cap measures are aimed at individual cases and claims, not
at the group of cases as a whole. Therefore, at least from a litigation
efficiency perspective, these methods of liability limitation are preferable
to the general liability cap employed by the ATSSSA.
Another potential problem with an ATSSSA-style liability cap is the
relationship between establishing the cap and the availability of liability
insurance. The ATSSSA, a statute completely retrospective in scope, does
nothing to address the availability of liability insurance, because all parties
facing liabilities had procured liability insurance prior to the event in
question and the subsequent congressional directive tying the limitation of
liability to the amount of available liability insurance. Any liability caps
254. Id. § 247d-6d(e)(l).
255. Id. § 247d-6d(a)(l). The statute still has serious boundary issues. The definitions of both the
national emergency or threat thereof as well as "countermeasure" seem to invite extensive litigation
over their limits.
256. See Conk, supra note 33, at 228-32.
257. Y2K Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 6601-6617 (West 2008). Because the millennium passed without a
major computer event, we will not know how effective the statute would have been at limiting liability.
258. Id. § 6601.
259. Id. § 6601(a)(6)-(7).
260. Id. § 6603.
261. Id. § 6611(a)-(b).
262. Id. §§ 6606-6607.
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that are either prospective, or somehow bridge the prospective/retrospective
gap must account for how such a liability cap will affect the pricing and
availability of liability insurance. Congress has already shown sensitivity to
this problem. The Price-Anderson Act requires nuclear contractors to
purchase the maximum amount of available privately underwritten liability
insurance.263 The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, which constructs a similar
program of public and private insurance for losses caused by cases of
foreign terrorism, also requires the purchase of privately underwritten
insurance.264 Continued attention to the requirement for purchase of private
insurance is essential, for a prospective liability scheme that mirrors the
ATSSSA would create an incentive for the amounts of liability insurance
coverage to drop dramatically.
2. Liability Caps and the Bankruptcy Analogy
The September 11 th plaintiffs are not the first litigants to encounter
the problems associated with distributing a fixed pool of assets among a
large group of plaintiffs that includes an unknown number of future
claimants. This is a common scenario in the bankruptcy proceedings of
corporations involved in the manufacture of products that result in mass
torts, such as asbestos manufacturers. Some commentators have even
suggested that bankruptcy proceedings are a preferable forum for the
resolution of certain complex litigation matters. 265 The solutions that have
been proposed and implemented in these matters may give some guidance
as to the structure that Congress could give to a liability cap in order to
avoid the problems that have arisen as a result of the ATSSSA's liability
cap.
One proposal is to give periodic rather than lump sum awards to mass
tort claimants in a bankruptcy. 266 This model would function like a variable
annuity in which the size of the payments would vary with respect to the
amount of money available and the best current estimates as to the numbers
of current and future plaintiffs. This model might work particularly well if
combined with a liability cap that uses the annual rather than aggregate
approach once proposed for the Price-Anderson Act.
263. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2210(b) (West 2008).
264. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 6701-6781 (West 2008).
265. See, e.g., Douglas G. Smith, Resolution of Mass Tort Claims in the Bankruptcy System, 41
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2008).
266. See generally Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 864-65
(1984).
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Another model called the "capital markets approach 2 67 involves using
the fixed pool of money to create a trust or financial instrument. Claimants
are then issued shares of the fund with one share per dollar of the claim. 268
The final number of shares equals the aggregate dollar value of claims, and
when the instrument matures, each shareholder shares pro rata in the
fund.269 The advantage of this approach is that current claimants can have
immediate access to funds by selling their shares on the market, and the
market itself will value the shares according to how many claims investors
expect will ultimately be filed.27°
Building this sort of mechanism into a liability cap could provide
needed structure to the resolution of claims. Congress could mandate the
structure in the text of the statute, or the parties to the litigation could agree
to this sort of fund distribution as part of a settlement plan. 271
Finally, Congress should be attuned to the problem of representation
of future claimants. In the case of a toxic tort MDL, there might not be a
class action under which the court is required to designate a class of future
claimants and assign it its own representative, 272 nor might there be a
bankruptcy in which the court appoints a guardian for future claimants. 273
Mindful of this, Congress might mandate that the district court overseeing
claims subject to a liability cap appoint a guardian or representative for
future claimants, and structure the arrangement so that the representatives
have incentives to meaningfully represent that group.274
VI. CONCLUSION
In an age of instant and pervasive mass media coverage, events of
267. See Thomas A. Smith, A Capital Markets Approach to Mass Tort Bankruptcy, 104 YALE L.J.
367, 394-401 (1994).
268. Id. at 396.
269. Id. at 397.
270. See generally Yair Listokin & Kenneth Ayotte, Protecting Future Claimants in Mass Tort
Bankruptcies, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1435 (2004) (critiquing the "capital markets approach").
271. Furthermore, it may be possible to structure a fund that is not a blanket settlement-that is, a
distribution that anticipates both litigated and settled claims. An example from the class action context
is the Fen-Phen settlement in which present and future claimants were given both litigation and
settlement options. Richard Nagareda has likened this to a "put option" in the financial markets. See
Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass Tort Class Action, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 747, 796-829 (2002).
272. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591 (1997).
273. See Alan N. Resnick, Bankruptcy as a Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise-Threatening Mass
Tort Liability, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2045, 2063 (2000) (stating that "the Bankruptcy Code does not
expressly provide for [appointing legal representatives for future claimants]).
274. See Listokin & Ayotte, supra note 270, at 1456-60.
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great dimensions can take on instant national significance. The pressure for
a federal response is high and the action taken is often hasty. The story of
the ATSSSA shows how Congress, eager to fashion a national response to
a catastrophic event, created a remedy that raised serious jurisdictional
concerns from the standpoint of federalism and for coordination of
complex litigation. To assert federal judicial supremacy over resolution of
disputes, Congress simply asserted jurisdiction over the entire event. To
show that the federal control would provide a sleek and efficient response,
Congress tied the cases together for litigation in a single judicial district. In
the short time since the September 11 th attacks, Congress has shown a
willingness to use the ideas of event jurisdiction and protective
coordination as organizing concepts for a new statutory regime. The
response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrates that it is not a foregone
conclusion that Congress will rush to write statutes designing remedies that
bundle together claims and place them under exclusively federal
jurisdiction. PREPA, however, shows Congress's favorable disposition
toward using events as an organizing concept of jurisdiction, although no
statute precisely like the ATSSSA has been passed.
This Article shows the problems that occur when Congress addresses
issues of potential industry collapse and efficient recovery to victims by
altering the jurisdictional boundaries that normally apply to litigation.
Moreover, experience in other situations shows the possibilities for dealing
with these problems by other means. Government can protect a vulnerable
industry by a number of means including direct subsidies and tax breaks. 275
Another such approach would be for the government to immunize an
industry from certain claims and then assume all liability claims itself
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 276 as it did in the National Swine Flu
Immunization Program of 1976.277 Statutes such as the Price-Anderson Act
that involve both a compensation fund and a litigation option organized
around event jurisdiction and protective coordination, and involving a
liability cap, require serious rethinking. The Hurricane Katrina experience
shows how coordination of postdisaster litigation can proceed when judges
and litigants make a more functional analysis of which cases to coordinate
275. See Ellen P. Aprill & Richard Schmalbeck, Post-Disaster Tax Legislation: A Series of
Unfortunate Events, 56 DUKE L.J. 51 (2006) (critiquing the efficacy of tax measures imposed after
September 11 th and Hurricane Katrina).
276. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (2000).
277. National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-380, 90 Stat. 1113
(repealed 1978). One author has observed that the Swine Flu cases "show[] that an FTCA mass
inoculation claim against government itself can be competently handled by ordinary tort principles
derived from state law." Conk, supra note 33, at 244.
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and where they should be litigated. It also demonstrates that
interjurisdictional cooperation between state and federal courts may allow
parties to achieve the efficiencies of pretrial procedure that Congress
believed it could achieve by simply federalizing all claims arising out of a
certain event.
It may be that the events of September 11 th were so unique that they
created a "perfect storm" of potential litigation and hasty congressional
response that is unlikely to occur again. Even so, it is important to
understand the difficulties that have ensued as a result of the ATSSSA. If
event jurisdiction and protective coordination never fully emerge as
organizing concepts of jurisdiction, then it might be that legislators have
understood the problematic nature of these ideas.
